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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Architectural Support for Securing Systems Against Software Vulnerabilities
by
Khaled Nofan Khasawneh
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Computer Science
University of California, Riverside, September 2019
Professor Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, Chairperson
Cyberattacks are the fastest growing crime in the U.S., and they are increasing in size,
sophistication, and cost. These attacks use vulnerabilities to compromise systems to
leak Information (Yahoo 2016, Marriott 2018, and Facebook 2019), steal identity infor-
mation (Equifax 2017), or even affecting politics (by attacking the governmental election
process). Traditionally, security researchers and practitioners have viewed security as
a software problem – originating in software and to be solved by software. Recently,
the Spectre and Meltdown attacks have shown that hardware should also be consid-
ered when evaluating the system security. Conversely, because many aspects of security
are computationally expensive, hardware can play a role in promoting software security
through computational support as well as the development of new abstractions that
promote security. Under this general umbrella, the research in this dissertation pursues
two research directions that demonstrate how hardware can promote software security,
and how we can design hardware that is secure against Spectre and Meltdown attacks.
In the first direction, security exploits and ensuant malware pose an increasing
challenge to computing systems as the variety and complexity of attacks continue to
increase. In response, software-based malware detection tools have grown in complexity,
vii
thus making it computationally difficult to use them to protect systems in real-time.
Against this drawback, hardware-based malware detectors (HMDs) are a promising new
approach to defend against malware. HMDs collect low-level architectural features and
use them to classify malware from normal programs. With simple hardware support,
HMDs can be always on, operating as a first line of defense that prioritizes the appli-
cation of more expensive and more accurate software-detector. In this dissertation, our
goal is to make HMDs practical for deployment in two ways:
(1) Improving the detection accuracy of HMDs: We use specialized detectors
targeted towards a specific type of malware to improve the detection of each type.
Next, we use ensemble learning techniques to improve the overall accuracy by combining
detectors. We explore detectors based on logistic regression (LR) and neural networks
(NN). The proposed detectors reduce the false-positive rate by more than half compared
to using a single detector, while increasing their sensitivity. We develop metrics to
estimate detection overhead; the proposed detectors achieve more than 16.6x overhead
reduction during online detection compared to an idealized software-only detector, with
an 8x improvement in relative detection time. NN detectors outperform LR detectors
in accuracy, overhead (by 40%), and time-to-detection of the hardware component (by
5x). Finally, we characterize the hardware complexity by extending an open-core and
synthesizing it on an FPGA platform, showing that the overhead is minimal.
(2) Make them resilient to evasion attacks: we explore the question of how well
evasive malware can avoid detection by HMDs. We show that existing HMDs can be
effectively reverse-engineered and subsequently evaded, allowing malware to hide from
detection without substantially slowing it down (which is important for certain types of
malware). This result demonstrates that the current generation of HMDs can be easily
defeated by evasive malware. Next, we explore how well a detector can evolve if it is
viii
exposed to this evasive malware during training. We show that simple detectors, such
as logistic regression, cannot detect the evasive malware even with retraining. More
sophisticated detectors can be retrained to detect evasive malware, but the retrained
detectors can be reverse-engineered and evaded again. To address these limitations,
we propose a new type of Resilient HMDs (RHMDs) that stochastically switch between
different detectors. These detectors can be shown to be provably more difficult to reverse
engineer based on resent results in probably approximately correct (PAC) learnability
theory. We show that indeed such detectors are resilient to both reverse engineering
and evasion, and that the resilience increases with the number and diversity of the
individual detectors. Our results demonstrate that these HMDs offer effective defense
against evasive malware at low additional complexity.
In the second direction, the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks show that
speculative execution, which is used pervasively in modern CPUs, can leave side effects
in the processor caches and other structures even when the speculated instructions do
not commit and their direct effect is not visible. Therefore, they utilize this behavior
to expose privileged information accessed speculatively to an unprivileged attacker. In
particular, the attack forces the speculative execution of a code gadget that will carry
out the illegal read, which eventually gets squashed, but which leaves a side-channel trail
that can be used by the attacker to infer the value. Several attack variations are possible,
allowing arbitrary exposure of the full kernel memory to an unprivileged attacker. In this
dissertation, we introduce a new model (SafeSpec) for supporting speculation in a way
that is immune to the side-channel leakage necessary for attacks such as Meltdown and
Spectre. In particular, SafeSpec stores side effects of speculation in separate structures
while the instructions are speculative. The speculative state is then either committed
to the main CPU structures if the branch commits, or squashed if it does not, making
ix
all direct side effects of speculative code invisible. The solution must also address the
possibility of a covert channel from speculative instructions to committed instructions
before these instructions are committed (i.e., while they share the speculative state). We
show that SafeSpec prevents all three variants of Spectre and Meltdown, as well as new
variants that we introduce. We also develop a cycle accurate model of modified design of
an x86-64 processor and show that the performance impact is negligible (in fact a small
performance improvement is achieved). We build prototypes of the hardware support
in a hardware description language to show that the additional overhead is acceptable.
SafeSpec completely closes this class of attacks, retaining the benefits of speculation,
and is practical to implement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We live in an increasingly connected and autonomous world where security
breaches to computing systems not only threaten our data but also our safety and liveli-
hood. Critical infrastructure is increasingly interconnected and offers interfaces open
to malicious actors. Cyberattacks are the fastest growing crime in the U.S., and they
are increasing in size, sophistication, and cost [152] – even major companies such as
Marriott [119], Equifax [44], Yahoo [102], and Facebook [66] find themselves the tar-
get of serious cyber attacks; the leaks of information from Yahoo in 2016, Marriott
in 2018, and Facebook in 2019 directly affected 500M, 500M, and 540M users respec-
tively [102, 119, 66]. Identity information, including the social security numbers, of
143M Equifax U.S. customer, were stolen in 2017 [44]. Furthermore, affecting even poli-
tics, specifically the governmental election process is not immune to cyber attacks [130].
Therefore, cybersecurity is a fundamental requirement that should be considered when
designing and evaluating computing systems on par with performance, functionality, or
power consumption.
1
Traditionally, security researchers and practitioners have viewed security as a
software problem – originating in software and to be solved by software. However, in
this dissertation, we argue that hardware can be used to help defenses but also
offers vulnerabilities:
• On one hand, much attention has been directed to the study of security defenses
at the system and application levels for many reasons, such as they are easier to
deploy and to update. However, these defenses may incur high overhead to the
system since it would consume hardware resources, which limit it’s use. Therefore,
hardware support can offer an advantage in terms of performance overhead by
providing accelerators for them in the hardware.
• On the other hand, the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks, which target specu-
lative execution, a computer architecture technique used for performance, showed
that vulnerabilities can arise from the architecture even if there are no weaknesses
in the software.
Therefore, this dissertation pursues approaches to building defenses in the ar-
chitecture in two directions: (1) Hardware support for accelerating software
defenses and (2) Hardware support for closing hardware vulnerabilities. In
the first direction, we were able to show that using the hardware support we can build
not only accurate hardware malware detectors (HMDs) that offer performance advan-
tage for the dynamic malware detection problem but also resilient to evasion attacks
from attackers. In the second direction, we examine vulnerabilities in computer hard-
ware that are exploitable by software and how to design systems that are not exposed
by such vulnerabilities. In particular, we developed an architectural principled solution
that can close all variants of Spectre and Meltdown.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we will first describe the research problems
this dissertation is trying to solve and the limitations of existing solutions in Section 1.1.
Then, we will follow by describing the contributions of this dissertation in Section 1.2.
Finally, we will describe the organization of this dissertation in Section 1.3.
1.1 Motivation: Limitations of State of the art
This dissertation pursues approaches to building defenses in the architecture
in two directions: (1) Hardware support for accelerating software defenses and
(2) Hardware support for closing hardware vulnerabilities. Figure 1.1 shows an
overview of this dissertation; in the first direction, to demonstrating an important class
of defenses that can be helped by hardware we choose malware detection. In particular,
dynamic malware detection since it requires monitoring the programs at all times, which
incur high overhead to the system that resulted in limiting it’s use in practice. Against
this drawback, this dissertation explores building practical hardware accelerators to
solve the dynamic malware detection limitations.
On the second direction, to demonstrating an important hardware vulnerability
we choose speculation attacks. Speculation attacks is a very dangerous class of attacks
that showed that vulnerabilities can arise from the architecture even if there are no
weaknesses in the software. Against this class of attacks, this dissertation explores
developing an architectural principled solution to close this class of attacks.
In this section, we will describe both problems (malware detection and specu-
lation attacks) that this dissertation is trying to solve and show the limitations of state
of the art solutions.
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1.1.1 Malware Detection
Malware detection is important since computing systems are under continuous
attacks by increasingly motivated and sophisticated adversaries; for example, over 900
million malware sample were reported by AV TEST in their malware zoo, with over
50 million coming in the first half of 2019 [11]. These attackers use vulnerabilities to
compromise systems and deploy malware (malicious software) [6]. Malware is created
for profit through forced advertising (adware) [31], spreading illicit and contraband
material or email spam (botnets) [137], stealing sensitive information (spyware) [26], or
to extort money (ransomware) [62]. Although significant efforts continue to be directed
at making systems more difficult to attack, the number of exploitable vulnerabilities
is overwhelming, and attacks could be installed by fooling users through phishing and
repackaged malware [178].
Since preventing malware from compromising the system is impossible, the
second approach of defense is to detect malware while/before compromising the system.
Traditionally, two techniques are used for malware detection: static malware detection
and dynamic malware detection. Static malware detection looks for signatures in the
executables. Example of static malware detection is antivirus software [166]. However,
it can be easily defeated by using various code obfuscation techniques [178]. On the
other hand, dynamic malware detection monitors the behavior of the running program
to detect malicious activities. However, the complexity and difficulty of dynamic mon-
itoring have traditionally limited its use due to constrained resources (10x slowdown is
common) [43].
Against this backdrop, researchers (and some commercial products [132]) have
been exploring the use of hardware malware detectors (HMD), which are always on and
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which have little to no impact on performance and complexity, to protect computing
systems. Specifically, HMDs are envisioned as the first line of defense to alert/prioritize
the activities of more accurate but more expensive software detectors [124]. However,
these detectors are not mature enough for practical deployment; (1) accuracy is not very
high and (2) their resilience to adversarial attacks has not been studied. Therefore, this
dissertation addresses the state of the art solutions limitations to bring HMDs closer
for practical deployment. In particular, this dissertation explores ways of building more
accurate HMDs using ensemble techniques and make them resilient to evasion attacks.
1.1.2 Speculation Attacks
Security and privacy are important due to the increasing amount of secret and
sensitive data that share the same infrastructure. Sharing the infrastructure allow ad-
versaries to steal information thought a side-channel [75, 115, 73]. Side channel attacks
are one of the most dangerous vulnerabilities to the could since it exploits weaknesses
in the implementation of otherwise secure systems and algorithms. Even isolated exe-
cution environments with enforcing strict access control are not immune to information
leaks through hardware resources. The recent dangerous speculation attacks, such as
Meltdown and Spectre [98, 89, 58, 106], target speculative execution (a standard mi-
croarchitectural technique used in virtually all modern CPUs to improve performance)
to access sensitive data and leak it through a side-channel. Several attack variations
have been demonstrated, including arbitrary exposure of the full memory of other pro-
cesses, OS kernel, hypervisor, and even SGX enclaves [29] to an unprivileged attacker,
making this a dangerous open attack vector on modern systems.
Although several defenses and software patches have been proposed to miti-
gate Spectre and Meltdown [159, 53], they often address only one aspect of the attack,
5
leaving attackers with other possible variations that are still available. Besides, these
patches often lead to high overheads: 10-30% reported on average, but often much
higher. For example, Netflix reported 800% slowdown with the Meltdown patches on
their systems [158, 52].
1.2 Contributions of the Dissertation
The research in this dissertation focuses on showing that architecture support
for security can help software be more secure by providing acceleration for software
solutions that are not practical due to their high overhead or by re-designing the archi-
tecture to close software exploitable vulnerabilities that software solution would incur
high overhead on the system, need recompilation of the programs, and/or need user
input/feedback (example, marking the secret data).
Therefore, in this section, we describe our contributions towards solving the
problems described in the previous section (Section 1.1); malware detection and specu-
lation attacks.
1.2.1 Malware Detection
We explored two research questions within this space: (1) How to build accu-
rate and inexpensive hardware detectors using ensemble learning techniques? and (2)
how to make detectors resilient to evasion from attackers?
(1) Accurate Hardware Malware Detectors (HMDs)
Hardware-based malware detectors (HMDs) are a promising new approach to
defend against malware. HMDs collect low-level architectural features and use them to
classify malware from normal programs. With simple hardware support, HMDs can be
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always on, operating as a first line of defense that prioritizes the application of more
expensive and more accurate software-detector. In this project, our goal is to increase
the accuracy of HMDs, to improve detection, and reduce overhead. We use specialized
detectors targeted towards a specific type of malware to improve the detection of each
type. Next, we use ensemble learning techniques to improve the overall accuracy by
combining detectors. We explore detectors based on logistic regression (LR) and neu-
ral networks (NN). The proposed detectors reduce the false-positive rate by more than
half compared to using a single detector, while increasing their sensitivity. We develop
metrics to estimate detection overhead; the proposed detectors achieve more than 16.6x
overhead reduction during online detection compared to an idealized software-only de-
tector, with an 8x improvement in relative detection time. NN detectors outperform
LR detectors in accuracy, overhead (by 40%), and time-to-detection of the hardware
component (by 5x). Finally, we characterize the hardware complexity by extending
an open-core and synthesizing it on an FPGA platform, showing that the overhead is
minimal.
(2) Evasion-Resilient Hardware Malware Detectors (HMDs)
Several aspects of the HMDs construction have been explored, leading to de-
tectors with high accuracy. However, in this project, we explore the question of how well
evasive malware can avoid detection by HMDs. We show that existing HMDs can be
effectively reverse-engineered and subsequently evaded, allowing malware to hide from
detection without substantially slowing it down (which is important for certain types of
malware). This result demonstrates that the current generation of HMDs can be easily
defeated by evasive malware. Next, we explore how well a detector can evolve if it is
exposed to this evasive malware during training. We show that simple detectors, such as
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logistic regression, cannot detect the evasive malware even with retraining. More sophis-
ticated detectors can be retrained to detect evasive malware, but the retrained detectors
can be reverse-engineered and evaded again. To address these limitations, we propose
a new type of Resilient HMDs (RHMDs) that stochastically switch between different
detectors. These detectors can be shown to be provably more resilient to evasion based
on resent results in probably approximately correct (PAC) learnability theory. We show
that indeed such detectors are resilient to both reverse engineering and evasion, and that
the resilience increases with the number and diversity of the individual detectors. Our
results demonstrate that these HMDs offer effective defense against evasive malware at
low additional complexity.
1.2.2 Speculation Attacks
We explored building a principled solution for speculation attacks that can be
used to protect against all variants of attacks with minimum impact on performance.
Leakage Free Speculation
Speculative attacks, such as Spectre and Meltdown, target speculative execu-
tion to access privileged data and leak it through a side-channel. To solve this problem,
we introduce (SafeSpec), a new model for supporting speculation in a way that is im-
mune to the side-channel leakage by storing side effects of speculative instructions in
separate structures until they commit. Additionally, we address the possibility of a
covert channel from speculative instructions to committed instructions before these in-
structions are committed. We develop a cycle accurate model of modified design of an
x86-64 processor and show that the performance impact is negligible.
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1.3 Organization of This Dissertation
Hardware Support for Security 
Close Hardware Vulnerabilities   Accelerate Software Defenses 
Dynamic Malware DetectionSpeculation Attacks 
Accurate HMDs:
Chapters 3,4,5
Evasion-Resilience HMDs:
Chapters 6,7,8
Leakage-Free Speculation:
Chapters 9,10,11
Figure 1.1: Dissertation overview
The goal of this dissertation is to show the importance of hardware support in
security; either through providing acceleration for software defenses or through closing
vulnerabilities that originate from the hardware. Therefore, in Chapter 2, we will de-
scribe the related works for the example problems that are used to support the goal of
this dissertation; malware detection and speculation attacks. The rest of this disserta-
tion will be organized into two main parts as follows:
PART 1: Hardware support for accelerating software defenses
This part is about exploring acceleration solutions for software defenses through
hardware support. Therefore, to solve the high overhead of the dynamic malware de-
tection solution through hardware support and make the hardware support for malware
detection more practical for deployment, this part can be divided into two main projects
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(1) Accurate HMDs: building accurate and inexpensive hardware detectors using en-
semble learning techniques (2) Evasion-Resilience HMDs: building HMDs that are
resilient to evasion attacks. The organization of the two projects is as follows:
Accurate HMDs
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Specializing HMDs Combining HMDs HMDs advantage
Figure 1.2: Building accurate HMDs project overview
(1) Accurate HMDS: in Chapter 3, we investigate whether specialized HMDs, each
targeting a specific type of malware, can more successfully classify that type of mal-
ware. In Chapter 4, we combine multiple detectors, general or specialized, to improve
the overall performance of the detection and we analyze the implications on the hard-
ware complexity of the different configurations. In Chapter 5, we develop metrics that
translate detection performance of HMDs to overhead and time-to-detection advantages
of the whole system and we conducted a longitudinal study to explore whether detec-
tors trained on a set of malware continue to be effective over time as malware evolves.
Figure 1.2 shows an overview of the chapters that compose this project.
Evasion-Resilience HMDs
Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8
Reverse-Engineering
HMDS Evading HMDs
Evasion Resilience
HMDs
Figure 1.3: Building evasion-resilience HMDs project overview
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(2) Evasion-Resilience HMDS: in chapter 6, we describe our threat model and
investigate wither HMDs be reverse-engineered. In Chapter 7, we explore wither having
a model of the detector, can malware developers modify malware to avoid detection.
Then we study the ability of malware to evade detection even if the detector is re-
trained with some samples of the evasive malware. In Chapter 8, we explore whether
new HMDs can be constructed that are robust to evasion and if they fundamentally
increase the difficulty of evasion or simply present another hurdle that can be bypassed
by attackers. Figure 1.3 shows an overview of the chapters that compose this project.
PART 2: Hardware support for closing hardware vulnerabilities
This part is about closing vulnerabilities that originate from the hardware
through hardware support. Therefore, we selected one of the most dangerous class of
attacks that exploit a hardware vulnerability (speculation attacks) to defend against
through hardware support. The organization of this project is as follows:
Leakage-Free Speculation
Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 11
Principle & threat
model
Leakage-free memory
hierarchy 
Transient Specualtion
Attacks
Figure 1.4: Leakage-free speculation project overview
Leakage-Free Speculation: to defend against speculation attacks, in Chapter 9, we
present the background needed and describe our principled solution (SafeSpec). In
Chapter 10, we describe the design of building a memory hierarchy (caches and TLBs)
that are free from speculation-induced leakage and presents a performance, complexity,
and security analysis of SafeSpec. In Chapter 11, we show that a covert channel can
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be created as a byproduct of applying SafeSpec (we call this type of attacks transient
speculation attacks (TSAs)) and explore how to construct the shadow state to mitigate
TSAs. Figure 1.4 shows an overview of the chapters that compose this project.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes before highlighting potential future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we present the related work of this dissertation. The orga-
nization of this chapter will be as follows: Section 2.1 will present the related work
in the malware detection space, hardware malware detection, and adversarial machine
learning. In Section 2.2, we will review all variants of speculation attacks. Then, we will
continue to present the state of the art defense that where proposed to protect against
speculation attacks.
2.1 Malware Detection
In this section, we discuss related work organized into two main parts. First,
we review related work in malware detection. In the second part, we discuss adversarial
classification and some important recent results in that domain.
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2.1.1 Hardware Malware Detection
Malware detection is an area that has attracted extensive research and com-
mercial interest over the past decade. In general, malware detection techniques are
either static (focusing on the structure of a program or system) or dynamic (analyzing
the behavior during execution) [64].
Static approaches including virus and spyware scanners are the first line of de-
fense in malware detection. Originally, these scanners operated using pattern matching
to look for signatures of known malware. However, these approaches can be easily evaded
using program obfuscation or simple code transformations that preserve the function of
the malware but make it not match the patterns known to the scanner [114]. More
advanced detectors based on semantic signatures have been proposed, and significantly
improved the performance of static scanners [32]. Static approaches are limited and can
be bypassed by sophisticated attackers [111]. In particular, code obfuscation techniques
(polymorphic malware), and malware encryption (packing or metamorphic malware) are
both sufficient to hide even from these more advanced detectors [111].
On the other hand, dynamic detection approaches observe the behavior of
the program (or the system) as it runs and interacts with the environment. Dynamic
behavior-based detection attempts to detect deviations from normal behavior of a pro-
gram as it operates. It detects anomalies in the observed behavior compared to its model
of normal behavior, which is often program-specific, to identify malware. A large number
of software malware detectors have been investigated that vary in terms of the monitored
events, the normal behavior model, and the detection algorithm [57, 135, 71, 64, 91].
The advantage of dynamic detection is that it is resilient to metamorphic and polymor-
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phic malware [111, 107]; it can even detect previously unknown malware. However, the
disadvantages include a typically high false positive rate, and the high cost of monitoring
during run-time. Moreover, since detection is a one time (or periodic) process, malware
can evade detection either probabilistically or by recognizing that it is being observed
and acting normally for that period.
Hardware based Malware Detectors (HMD) have attracted significant interest
recently because they can be always on and essentially free in terms of performance and
resource impact. Bilar et al. were the first to use the frequency of opcodes occurrence in
a program as a feature for discriminating normal programs from malware [18]. Santos
et al. and Yan et al. use opcode sequence signatures as a feature [139, 172]. Runwal et
al. use similarity graphs of opcode sequences [136]. Recently, Demme et al. suggested
using features based on performance counters [37]. Tang et al. conducted a similar
study but used unsupervised learning [153]. Kazdagli et al. [77] introduced several new
improvements to the construction methodology for both supervised and unsupervised
learning based HMDs applied to mobile malware. All of these studies conduct oﬄine
analysis; none of the studies explore online detection or implementation using hardware.
On the other hand, similar to our work, a real-time hardware malware detector was
built by Ozsoy et al. [122]. However, they used a single detectors while our work uses
an ensemble of specialized detectors.
Chavis et al. proposed an enterprise-class antivirus analysis framework, called
SNIFFER [27]. Similar to our work, each machine in the network collect low-level
features online using hardware. For each detection period, each machine transfers its
collected features securely to a server which classifies them (hardware feature collection,
but software classification). The detectors are general detectors; we believe that the
ensemble techniques that improve the accuracy can reduce the false positives in this
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system as well. Both the settings and the malware types (network attacks) considered
by the paper are different than our environment.
Ensemble learning is a well-known technique in machine learning to combine
the decisions of multiple base detectors to improve accuracy [169]. Ensemble learning
is attractive because of its generalization ability which is much powerful than using
one learner [39]. For ensemble detector to work, the base detectors have to be diverse;
if the detectors are highly correlated, there is little additional value from combining
them [134]. In this work, the diversity is based on different features (general ensemble
detector), data sets (mixed ensemble detector), or both (specialized ensemble detector).
In contrast to traditional machine learning approaches that use the training data to
learn one hypothesis, some of our ensembles learn a set of subset-hypotheses (specialized
detectors) and combine them. Ensemble learning may be considered a form of two-stage
detection with the base detectors in the first stage, and the synthesis of their decision
in the second. A two stage anomaly detector was proposed by Zhang et al. [181, 182]
who use machine learning classifiers to build network traffic dependency graph, and then
they used a root-trigger policy to identify outlier network requests. These works focus
on the dependency knowledge of the first level, while our work focuses on combining the
results of detectors that are trying to answer different questions.
The specialized ensemble detector combines multiple specialized detectors and
dynamically collects the features to perform online detection. Researchers built ensem-
ble malware detectors [180, 101, 175, 10, 116, 45, 177, 103, 145, 146, 61, 121, 49, 128],
based on combining general detectors. Moreover, most of them used off-line analy-
sis [175, 10, 145, 146, 45, 177, 61]. A few used dynamic analysis [116, 49, 128] and some
used both static and dynamic analysis [101, 103, 121]. None of these works uses archi-
tecture features or is targeted towards hardware implementation (which requires simpler
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machine learning algorithms). Specialized detectors were previously proposed [92] for
use in malware classification (i.e., labeling malware). Labeling is used to classify col-
lected malware using oﬄine analysis which is a different application than the one we
consider.
We present a few recent examples of the use of ensemble learning for malware
detection in more detail. Zhang et al. [180] extracted n-gram features from the programs
binary code and used it in malware detection. The ensemble composed of multiple prob-
abilistic neural network (PNN) classifiers and the Dempster Shafer theory was utilized to
combine them. Sami et al. [138] used API calls extracted from the Portable Executable
(PE) Import Address table to build an ensemble detector using random forests. Mehmet
et al. [121] created an ensemble detector for android malware by creating base detectors
based on different features and learning algorithms. After that, the base detectors were
combined using stacking or majority voting to form the ensemble system. However, the
previous work does not try to combine specialized detectors to build the ensemble sys-
tem. Smutz et al. recently explored the use of a diversified ensemble detector to classify
possibly evasive PDF malware [149]. Note that all the above techniques use software
detectors, on rich features and using advanced machine learning algorithms.
This work extends our prior work [82] which considered ensembles of only LR
detectors. The NN ensemble detectors presented in this work are over 20% faster than
the best LR ensemble detector while requiring 40% less overhead. Additionally, we
study the speed of hardware component in detecting malware online and show that NN
ensemble is 5x faster than the LR ensemble detector, potentially limiting the damage of
the malware. This work also presents a hardware design of the NN ensemble detectors
and analyzes their complexity. The malware longitudinal study in Section 5.2 is also a
new contribution of this project, and demonstrates the need for HMDs to be retrainable.
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Zhou et al., argue against the practicality of using hardware performance coun-
ters (HPCs) for malware detection [184]. They categorize the drawbacks that they
observed into the following classes:
1. Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI).
2. Virtual Machines (VMs).
3. No Cross-Validations or Insufficient Validations
The first class of drawbacks is using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI).
DBI can be used to instrument the monitored program in order to collect features dur-
ing it’s execution. Examples of these tools are Pin [104], QEMU [13], Valgrind [117],
or DynamoRIO [20]. The reason DBI is a drawback is that it introduces a substantial
amount of performance overhead and is thus not suited to run in an always-on, online
protection setting, which is the default use-case for current anti-malware suites. How-
ever, in our work we use DBI to collect features for two main reasons: (1) DBI feature
collection is much more accurate and stable than HPCs [36], which results in more stable
and accurate results (2) DBI was used just for experiments and identifying the features.
However, as we show in Chapter 4.2, we extended the processor implementation by
integrated a feature collection unit to the end of the commit stage of the processor’s
pipeline eliminate the overhead from using DBI for features collection.
The second class of drawbacks is using virtual machines (VMs) to run the mon-
itored programs. The reason for using VMs in a drawback is that HPCs are limited and
shared resource between the host and all VMs. Thus, virtualizing HPCs is a challenge in
itself [36], which results in inaccurate HPCs values. However, using DBI to instrument
programs inside a VM does not affect the results of the DBI.
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The third drawback class is not using cross-validation in the experiments.
Cross-validation [7] is used to prevent the machine learning model from overfitting [55]
by examining the model with different inputs of training-and-testing examples. How-
ever, in our experiments, we used 10-folds cross-validation to make sure that we have
made sufficient validation of the models.
Another issue of using HPCs for malware detection is the adversary arability
to create evasive samples that can evade the detection [36]. Therefore, in our following
work [79] (Chapters 6,7,8), we explored how malware writers may attempt to evade
HMDs. The work shows that NN detectors are amenable to retraining when malware
evolves. The work proposed creating multiple diverse detectors and switching between
them randomly, which makes HMDs provably more robust to evasion attacks. While
such detectors use multiple base detectors they use only one at a time. It is interesting
to explore the combination of ensemble and evasion resilient HMDs.
2.1.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
Several studies have looked at attacking machine learning models. Attacks
can be classified into two types: poisoning and evasion attacks [12]. In poisoning at-
tacks, the adversary focuses on injecting malicious samples in the training data as an
attempt to influence the accuracy of the model [17, 87]. For evasion attacks, similar
to our own, the adversary crafts input samples that aim to be misclassified by the
model [171, 96, 15, 50, 126]. Several evasion attacks were studied in the image clas-
sification field. An adversary can make changes to the pixels of an image to cause
miss-classification of the image but will not change the visibility of the image to the
human eye [15, 50, 126]. Since images have high entropy they can be easily manipulated
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without changing the appearance of the image. On the other hand, in the malware
detection domain, manipulating malware programs have different challenges since the
functionality of the malware needs to be preserved. Evasion attacks in contexts outside
image classification have also been considered. Such attacks are called mimicry at-
tacks [21, 165]. Although recent studies [16, 35, 162] have provided theoretical grounds
for randomization as a possible solution in adversarial classification, practical algorithms
have yet to be developed for this problem.
Related to our evasion attack on malware detectors, researchers recently pro-
posed evasive attacks on PDF malware detectors [171, 96]. These works consider static
classifiers using structural features present in the PDF image. In contrast, our contri-
bution targets detectors for a wide range of malware and we consider run-time anomaly
detection using microarchitectural features. Besides the different nature of the applica-
tion, our work makes a number of contributions relative to these recent works including
showing how to reverse engineer the classifiers, reverse-engineering driven instruction
injection to evade detection (they use random modifications), exploring the impact of
retraining, and providing theoretical insights based on PAC theory into the structure of
the problem. Moreover, these studies do not explore resilient classification.
Similar to the reverse engineering component of our work, Trame`r et al. [155] were
able to reverse-engineer machine learning models against production Machine Learning-
as-a-service (MLaaS) providers. However, they assumed that they know the features
used by the target classifier. In addition, Shokri et al. [148] were able to use reverse-
engineered models to perform a membership inference attack (given a data record and
black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model’s training dataset)
against MLaaS providers. In both works, they attempt reverse engineering using random
noise [155, 148]. We believe that this approach does not work in our threat model where
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we do not have access to the classifier confidence (we see the output as a label, not as
a probability), and where classification is a continuous process, which makes it difficult
to assess incremental changes.
Khasawneh et al. used ensemble learning to improve the accuracy of HMDs [83,
78, 97]. Superficially, ensemble learning is similar to RHMD since it combines the out-
put of multiple diverse detectors through a combiner function such as majority voting
to improve the overall detection performance. However, since ensemble classifiers are
deterministic, they can be reverse engineered and evaded. In contrast, the stochastic
switching between individual detectors in RHMD makes both reverse-engineering and
evasion difficult with a difficulty that increases with the number and diversity of the
individual detectors. Smutz et al. also studied the use of an ensemble for PDF mal-
ware detection [149]; when the baseline detectors disagree, they consider this a possible
indicator of evasive malware.
Although hardware-supported malware detection offers many advantages as it
can be always on and has a low overhead on both power and performance, if HMDs are
widely deployed, we must expect that attackers will attempt to evade detection as is the
case in any adversarial setting. In this work, we show that without hardening HMDs, it
is possible to reverse engineer and evade them, bringing into question the effectiveness
of HMDs. Our work also explores whether retraining can be used to continue to track
malware evasion, as well as the construction of resilient hardware malware detectors.
With these results we believe evasion resilient HMDs become practical, bringing such
solutions closer to practical deployment.
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2.2 Speculation Attacks and Defenses
In this section, we discuss related work to speculation attacks organized into
two main parts. First, we review variants of speculation attacks. In the second part, we
discuss deployed and proposed defenses against speculation attacks.
2.2.1 Speculation Attacks
Since the initial announcement of Spectre and Meltdown in January of 2018,
multiple variants of Spectre [90, 86, 93, 105, 48, 59, 29, 143] and Meltdown [99, 156, 160,
141, 161, 110, 140] have been proposed. Spectre attacks are characterized by manipulat-
ing the prediction mechanisms to trigger speculation to an attacker chosen gadget. They
differ in what they exploit to trigger speculation: branch direction predictor (variant 1,
variant 1.1) [90, 48, 86], branch target predictor (or branch target buffer) for variant
2 [90], return stack buffer for Spectre-RSB (also called variant 5) [93, 105], or load-store
aliasing predictor for variant 4 [59].
On the other hand, Meltdown attack exploits speculative out-of-order instruc-
tions that lead to an exception. Multiple variants have been proposed: the original
Meltdown [99], Foreshadow [160, 167], and RIDL [161] exploit the page fault, Meltdown
variant 1.2 [86] exploit the bound range exceeded exception, Lazy FP [151] exploit the
device-not-available exception, Meltdown variant 3a [9] exploit the general protection
fault, Fallout [110] exploit the write transient forwarding, and ZombieLoad [141] exploit
the fill-buffer logic. Canella et al. summarize these and additional variants [23].
To mitigate these attacks, several software and hardware defenses ranging
from programming guidelines for cryptographic software developers [24] to architec-
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tural changes [81, 173] have been proposed. In general, these solutions are ad hoc, often
focused on a specific attack. Moreover, most result in substantial performance impact.
In this section, we will overview these defenses categorized into three categories (1)
speculation prevention: prevent speculation execution, (2) Secret data protection: pro-
vides secret data isolation, (3) Side-channel prevention: that interfere with side channel
communication.
2.2.2 Speculation prevention
These defenses focus on preventing speculation by preventing misprediction [67,
120, 159, 68, 86] or faults [160]. Intel, AMD, and ARM proposed to use instructions
that serialize the execution (e.g. lfence) to stop speculation around branches (e.g. both
directions of the branch) [67, 8, 2]. Although liberal serialization (e.g., at every branch
instruction) can mitigate some Spectre attacks, doing so severely hurts performance [67]:
serializing all branch instructions will eliminate the performance benefit of the branch
predictor (e.g., up to 10x slowdown [120]). Against this drawback, multiple proposals
tried to reduce the number of serializing instructions introduced using static analysis to
serialize execution around exploitable gadgets only [67, 108, 65, 164]. However, these
approaches miss some of the gadgets that can be exploited [88]. Another weakness about
these defenses is that even though they stop speculative execution around exploitable
gadgets, they do not stop speculative code fetches and other micro-architectural be-
haviors before execution (e.g., instruction cache and iTLB fills) which can still leak
data [143].
Furthermore, Speculative Load Hardening (SLH) [25] and You Shall Not By-
pass (YSNB) [120] tried to reduce the high overhead of using liberal fences. Therefore,
they proposed to identify Spectre gadgets, then injecting artificial dependencies between
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branches and identified gadgets. Doing so will reduce the speculation window of the at-
tack. Although this would results in performance advantage over liberal fencing, they
still have 36%-60% performance overhead [154].
Google proposed Return Trampoline (retpoline) [159] as a software mitiga-
tion technique that defends against Spectre-BTB by replacing indirect branches with
push+return instruction sequence that prevent BTB poisoning. However, this solution
has high performance overhead since it stops speculation (similar to serialization). In
addition, it can be bypassed using ret instructions since they cause miss-speculation
through BTB; this is a by-product of a feature on Intel’s Skylake+ processors (starting
from Skylake) that allow processors to predict the address of a ret instruction from BTB
in case of RSB underfilling. To solve this exploit, RSB stuffing [69] was proposed to
intentionally fill the RSB with benign delay gadgets to avoid misspeculation on con-
text switches. Although this technique can partially mitigate Spectre-BTB (when using
ret to trigger speculation through BTB), it can also defend against SpectreRSB cross-
domains attack. However, since we are filling the RSB on context switch, stored entries
for the currently running process will be lost when execution is switched back to the
current process (i.e. performance loss due to losing speculation information). Against
this drawback, saves committed RSB entries per process in case of a context switch out
of the process and restores them when execution returns to the process, which results
in improving the prediction performance of ret instructions.
Intel and AMD added new instructions to their instruction set architecture
(ISA) that can control indirect branches to defend against Spectre-BTB [70, 2]. The
addition consists of three controls:
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• Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS): allows processors to enter IBRS
mode (privileged mode) and execute indirect branches that are not influenced by
less privileged mode.
• Single Thread Indirect Branch Prediction (STIBP): will not allow a hyperthread
running on a core to use branch predictor entries inserted by the other thread
running on the same core.
• The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB): allows processors to flush BTB
and clear their state. This way the code executed before the barrier cannot impact
branch prediction of the code executed after this instruction.
These new ISA instructions defend only against Spectre-BTB. In addition, they
have a high performance overhead; up to 24% on Skylake and up to 53% on Haswell [41].
Moreover, SLoth [86] is a group of micro-architectural defenses that constrain
store-to-load forwarding to defend against Spectre v1.1 and v4; (1) SLoth Bear: mi-
crocode update that prevents store-to-load forwarding from either speculative stores or
to speculative loads. (2) SLoth: choose candidates for forwarding based on compiler
marking instructions. (3) Arctic SLoth: apply dynamic detection of load and store
pairs to determine candidates for forwarding. Nevertheless, this approach does not de-
fend against Spectre v1 and require software, compiler, and hardware changes that result
in performance overhead and implementation complexity.
An attractive hardware solution is Context-Sensitive Fencing (CSF) [154]. CSF
is a micro-code mitigation technique were serialization instructions are added dynami-
cally based on run-time conditions that identify potential exploit execution. Injecting
serialization instructions dynamically reduces the impact of stopping speculation on
performance which results in low performance overhead. Moreover, CSF proposed to
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defend against Spectre v2 and Spectre-RSB using a special fence that would flush the
BTB/RSB when transferring control to higher domains. However, flushing BTB and
RSB would hurt performance since it will result in more mis-predictions. In addition,
in simultaneous multithreading (SMT) processor, flushing the BTB/RSB after control
transfer is not enough to protect against Spectre-BTB and Spectre-RSB since they can
be polluted after the control transfer using other threads.
ConTExT [142] introduced protecting secret data from speculative execution.
Basically, they proposed a new memory mapping (called non-transient mapping) which
indicates data that must not be accessed by speculative instructions. Nevertheless, this
solution requires changes to the architecture and the operating system, the developer
involvement by annotating the secret data, and incur high performance overhead for
security-critical applications.
2.2.3 Secret data protection:
These defenses focus on making sure that secret data can not be reached [53,
99]. However, they have limitations: Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) [53, 99]
have performance overhead and some privileged memory locations must always remain
mapped in user space due to x86 design [23], and Site Isolation [131] limits the amount
of data that is exposed to side-channel attacks but attacks are still possible.
2.2.4 Side-channel prevention:
Since speculation attacks use a side-channel to communicate secret data out
of the speculative execution gadget, these type of defenses is designed to prevent such
communication. The benefits from such defenses are: (1) performance since they allow
speculation (2) defend against all attack variants since all variants use side-channels to
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leak the secret data. Furthermore, this category of defense is most relevant to our work
since SafeSpec falls into this category.
Dynamically Allocated Way Guard (DAWG): DAWG [85] is a method to securely
partition the cache at the cache way granularity to provide isolation between protection
domains. Therefore, it requires changes to the cache and coherence protocol. In addition,
it requires domains enforcement management in software. While this solution, similar
to our defense, prevents leaking the data through a side-channel, it only protects across
isolation domains and not those performed within the same address space or isolation
domain.
InvisiSpec: most relevant to our work, and developed concurrently with it (SafeSpec
technical report was disclosed in June, 2018 [81]), is an architectural solution called
InvisiSpec [173]. Like SafeSpec, InvisiSpec is designed to make transient loads invisible
in the cache hierarchy. InvisiSpec focus is on cache coherence and memory consistency
rather than understanding the implications on a single core. They did not consider
transient side channels on the shadow structures, sizing issues, or carry out overhead
characterization. Moreover, InvisiSpec was focusing on protecting the d-cache while we
developed attacks and defenses on i-cache and the TLB, applying the principle more
widely.
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Figure 3.1: Building accurate HMDs project overview
Computing systems at all scales face a significant threat from malware; over
900 million malware sample was reported by AV TEST in their malware zoo, with over
50 million coming in the first half of 2019 [11]. Obfuscation and evasion techniques
increase the difficulty of detecting malware after a machine is infected [178]. Zero-day
exploits – novel exploits never seen before – defy signature based static analysis since
their signatures have not been yet encountered in the wild. Thus, dynamic detection
techniques [43] that can detect the malicious behavior during execution are needed [33,
94], to protect against such attacks. However, the difficulty and complexity of dynamic
monitoring in software have traditionally limited its use.
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Recent studies have shown that Hardware Malware Detectors (HMDs) that
carry out anomaly detection in low-level feature spaces such as hardware events, can
distinguish malware from normal programs [37, 18]. Then, an online HMD was intro-
duced as hardware supported classifier trained using supervised learning that contin-
uously monitors and differentiates malware from normal programs while the programs
run [123, 124]. To tolerate false positives, this system is envisioned as a first step in
malware detection to prioritize which processes should be dynamically monitored using
a more sophisticated but more expensive second level of protection.
In this chapter, we pursue approaches to enhance the classification accuracy
of HMDs. Improving accuracy increases their ability to detect malware, and reduces
the overhead that results from false positives. Therefore, in this chapter, as shown
is Figure 3.1, we explore whether specialized detectors, each targeting a specific type
of malware, can more successfully classify that type of malware. After confirming that
specialized detectors perform better than general detectors, we identify the features that
perform best for each specialized detector. We characterize how specialized detectors
trained for specific malware types perform compared to a general detector and show
that specialization has significant performance advantages.
3.1 Approach and Evaluation Methodology
We consider a system with a hardware malware detector (HMD) similar to
those recently proposed in literature [37, 123, 77]. HMD exploit the fact that the com-
putational footprint of malware differs from that of normal programs in low-level feature
spaces. Detectors built using such features appear to be quite successful; Qualcomm an-
nounced the use of a similar technology in their Snapdragon processor [133]. Early
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studies relied on opcode mixes [18, 139, 172, 136]. More recently, Demme et al. [37]
showed that malware programs can be classified effectively by the use of oﬄine machine
learning model applied to low-level features; in this case they used features available
through hardware performance counters of the ARM processor collected periodically.
This work improves on prior work by Ozsoy et al. [123] who built an online
hardware-supported, low-complexity, malware detector. The online detection problem
uses a time-series window based averaging to detect transient malware behavior. As
detection is implemented in hardware, simple machine learning algorithms are used
to avoid the overhead of complex algorithms. This work demonstrated that low-level
architectural features can be used to detect malware in real-time.
In this study, our goal is to improve the effectiveness of online HMD. Improv-
ing the detection performance leads to more malware being detected with fewer false
positives. We explore using specialized detectors for different malware types to improve
detection. We show that specialized detectors are more effective than general detec-
tors in classifying their malware type. Furthermore, in Chapter 4, we study different
approaches for combining the decisions of multiple detectors to achieve better classifi-
cation. In this section, we present some details of the methodology including the Data
Set and the choice of features for classification.
3.1.1 Data Set
Our data set consists of 3,653 malware programs and 554 regular Windows
programs (the malware samples that we use are Windows-based). This regular program
set contains the SPEC 2006 benchmarks [56], Windows system binaries, and many
popular applications such as Acrobat Reader, Notepad++, and Winrar. The malware
programs were chosen from the MalwareDB malware set [118].
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The group of regular and malware programs were all executed within a virtual
machine running a 32-bit Windows 7 with the firewall and security services for Windows
disabled. We observed that this desktop malware does not require user interaction to
operate maliciously, in contrast to prior work that showed that mobile malware does
not run correctly without user interaction [77]. We verified that a large sample (more
than half) of our malware ran correctly by manually checking run-time behaviour. In
fact, the intrusion detection monitoring systems on our network were tripped several
times due to malware trying to search for and attack other machines. Eventually, we
set up the environment in an independent subnet. However, for the regular programs,
we manually interacted with them to trigger an expressive representation. The Pin
instrumentation tool [34] was used to gather the dynamic traces of programs as they
were executed. Each trace was collected after 150 system calls for a duration of 5,000
system calls or 15 million committed instructions, whichever is first.
The malware data set consists of five types of malware:
1. Backdoors: bypass the normal authentication of the system.
2. Password Stealers (PWS): steals user credentials using a key-logger and sends
them along with the visited website to the attacker.
3. Rogues: pretend to be an antivirus program and try to sell the victim its services.
4. Trojans: appear to be harmless programs but contain malicious code.
5. Worms: attempt to spread to other machines using various methods.
We selected only malware programs that were labeled as malware by Microsoft
and used the Microsoft classification for their type [109]. Each malware set (correspond-
ing to the malware type) and the regular programs set were randomly divided into three
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subsets; training (60%), testing (20%) and validation (20%) as shown in Table 3.1. These
are typical ratios used in training classifiers. The training and testing sets were used to
train and test the detectors respectively. The validation set was used for exploring the
settings of training and detection.
We note that both the number of programs and the duration of the profil-
ing of each program is limited by the computational and storage overheads; since we
are collecting dynamic profiling information through Pin [34] within a virtual machine,
collection requires several weeks of execution on a small cluster, and produces several
terabytes of compressed profiling data. Training and testing is also extremely compu-
tationally intensive. This dataset is sufficiently large to establish the feasibility and
provide a reasonable evaluation of the proposed approach.
Table 3.1: Malware data set breakdown; showing the number of samples that is used
for training, testing, and validation from each malware type.
Total Training Testing Validation
Backdoor 815 489 163 163
Rogue 685 411 137 137
PWS 557 335 111 111
Trojan 1123 673 225 225
Worm 473 283 95 95
Regular 554 332 111 111
3.1.2 Feature Selection
At the architecture/hardware level, there are many features that could be
collected. To enable direct comparison of the proposed ensemble detector against a
single detector, we use the same features used by Ozsoy et al. [123]. For completeness,
we describe the rationale behind these features:
32
• Instruction mix features: collected based on the types and/or frequencies of
executed opcodes. We considered four features based on opcodes. Feature INS1
tracks the frequency of opcode occurrence in each of the x86 instruction categories.
The top 35 opcodes with the largest difference (delta) in frequency between mal-
ware and regular programs were aggregated and used as feature (INS2). Finally,
INS3 and INS4 are a binary version of INS1 and INS2 respectively; INS3 tracks
the presence of opcodes in each category and INS4 indicating opcode presence for
the 35 largest difference opcodes.
• Memory reference patterns: collected based on memory addresses used by
the program. Feature MEM1 keeps track of the memory reference distance in
quantized bins (i.e., creates a histogram of the memory reference distance). The
binary version of MEM1 is feature MEM2 that tracks the presence of a load/store
in each of the distance bins.
• Architectural events: collected based on architectural events. The features
collected were: total number of memory reads, memory writes, unaligned memory
accesses, immediate branches and taken branches. This feature is called ARCH in
the remainder of the paper.
Consistent with the methodology used by earlier works [37, 123], we collected
the features once every 10K committed instructions of the running program. The se-
lected frequency (10K) effectively balances complexity and detection accuracy for of-
fline [37] and online [123] detection. Thus, for each program we maintained a sequence
of these feature vectors collected every 10K instructions, labeled as either malware or
normal.
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3.2 Characterizing Performance of Specialized Detectors
In this section, we introduce specialized detectors: those that are trained to
identify a specific type of malware. First, we investigate whether such detectors’ per-
formance exceeds that of general detectors, which are trained to classify any type of
malware. After establishing that they do indeed outperform general detectors, we pro-
ceed by exploring how to use such detectors to improve the overall detection of the
system.
We used two different classification algorithms in our experiments: (1) Logistic
Regression (LR), which is a simple classification algorithm [60] that separates two classes
using a linear boundary in the feature space. The motivation behind using LR is the ease
of implementation in hardware; and (2) Neural Networks (NN) which is a network of
perceptrons that can be trained to approximate a classification function that is generated
from the training data. Note that a single perceptron in NN is equivalent to LR [3];
thus, NN is expected to outperform LR but with the cost of additional implementation
complexity. The motivation of using NN is its more effective classificaiton due to its non-
linear boundary. Additionally, NN can detect evasive malware when retrained, while LR
cannot [79].
The collected feature data for programs and malware is used to train LR and
NN detectors. We pick the threshold for the output of the detector, which is used to
separate a malware from a regular program, such that it maximizes the sum of the sen-
sitivity (recall) and specificity. Sensitivity is the proportion of malware that the system
correctly identifies as malware while specificity is the proportion of regular programs
that the system correctly identifies as regular programs [150]. For each detector in this
work, we present the threshold values to enable reproduction of our experiments.
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Training General Detectors The general detectors are designed to detect any type
of malware. Therefore, a general detector is trained using a data set that encompasses
all types of malware programs, against another set with regular programs. We trained
seven general detectors, one for each of the feature vectors we considered.
Training Specialized Detectors The specialized detectors are designed to detect a
specific type of malware relative to the regular programs. We identify the malware type
and separate our malware sets into these types based on Microsoft Malware Protection
Center classification [109]. The specialized detectors were trained only with malware
that matches the detector type, as well as regular programs, so that it would have a
better model for detecting the type of malware it is specialized for. For example, the
Backdoors detector is trained to classify Backdoors from regular programs only. We
chose this approach rather than also attempting to classify malware types from each
other because false positives among malware types are not important for our goals.
Moreover, types of malware may share features that regular programs do not have and
thus classifying them from each other makes classification against regular programs less
effective.
3.2.1 Specialized Detectors: Is There an Opportunity?
Intuitively, each malware type has different behaviour allowing specialized de-
tectors to more accurately carry out classification. Thus, in this section, we explore this
intuition and quantify the advantage obtained from specializing detectors.
We built specialized detectors for each type of malware we have in the data set
(Backdoor, PWS, Rogue, Trojan and Worm). Next, we compared the performance of
each of the seven general detectors against each of the specialized detectors performance
with respect to classifying the specific malware type for which the specialized detector
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was trained. Each comparison between specialized and general detectors uses the same
testing set for both of detectors. The testing set includes regular programs and the
malware type that the specialized detector was designed for.
We compared the performance of the best performing LR and NN general
detector against the best LR and NN specialized detector for each type of malware.
Figure 3.2(a) shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves of the LR
INS4 general detector (best performing LR general detector) while Figure 3.2(b) shows
the ROC curves for the best LR specialized detectors for each type of malware (MEM1
for Trojans, MEM2 for PWS, INS4 for Rogue, and INS2 for both Backdoor and Worms).
The ROC curves represent the classification rate (i.e., Sensitivity) as a function of false
positives (100-Specificity) for different threshold values between 0 and 1. In most cases,
the specialized detectors outperform the general detector, sometimes significantly.
Figure 3.3 shows the average improvement of the Area Under the Curve (AUC)
for each type of malware using the best LR general detector (INS4) and the best NN gen-
eral detector (INS2). It also shows the performance of the best LR specialized detector,
and the best NN specialized detector for each type of malware. Overall, the improve-
ment opportunity is 0.0904 for using specialized LR detectors over general LR detectors
and 0.06 for using specialized NN detectors over general NN detectors improving the
AUC by more than 9% and 6% respectively. This improvement has a substantial impact
on performance. For example, the improvement in Rogue detection, 8% in the AUC,
translates to a 4x reduction in overhead needed for detection according to the work
metric we define in Chapter 5). In addition, the specialized NN detectors outperform
all other detectors.
Figure 3.4 shows the accuracy values for each of the previous AUC when picking
the best operating point (maximum sensitivity+specificity). This results also supports
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Figure 3.2: ROC improvement opportunity; comparing the ROC of detecting each mal-
ware type by the best general and the best specialized detector
the conclusion that specialized NN detectors outperform all other detectors.
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Figure 3.3: AUC improvement opportunity; comparing the AUC of detecting each mal-
ware type by the best general and the best specialized detector
Its clear that specialized detectors are more successful than general detectors in
classifying malware. However, it is not clear why different features are more successful
in detecting different classes of malware, or indeed why classification is at all possible
in this low-level feature space. To attempt to answer this question, we examined the
weights in the Θ vector of the LR ARCH feature specialized detector for Rogue and
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Figure 3.4: Accuracy improvement opportunity; comparing the best accuracy of detect-
ing each malware type by the best general and the best specialized detector
Worm respectively. This feature obtains 0.97 AUC for Rogue but only 0.56 for Worm.
We find that the Rogue classifier discovered that the number of branches in Rogue
where significantly less than normal programs while the number of misaligned memory
addresses were significantly higher. In contrast, Worm weights were very low for all
ARCH vector elements, indicating that Worms behaved similar to normal programs in
terms of all architectural features.
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Figure 4.1: Building accurate HMDs project overview
After confirming that specialized detectors perform better than general detec-
tors and identified the features that perform best for each specialized detector (Chap-
ter 3), we investigated combining multiple detectors, general or specialized, to improve
the overall performance of the detection to build an ensemble detector. Combining
specialized detectors is different from classical ensemble learning where multiple diverse
detectors with identical goals are combined to enhance their accuracy. In particular,
in our problem, the specialized detectors each answers a different question in the form
of: ”is the current program a malware of type X?” where X is the type of malware the
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detector is specialized for. Combining such detectors requires different forms of combi-
nation functions to produce the ensemble decision. We evaluate the performance of the
ensemble detectors in both oﬄine and online detection. Furthermore, we analyze the
implications on the hardware complexity of the different configurations in Section 4.2.
In summary, in this chapter, we use ensemble learning to improve the perfor-
mance of the HMD:
• We study using classical ensemble learning by combining multiple general detectors
that are trained based on different features.
• We explore combining the specialized detectors for each malware type.
• We investigate a mixed detector by combining general and specialized detectors.
Moreover, we evaluate the hardware complexity of the proposed designs by
extending the AO486 open core. We propose and evaluate some hardware optimization
to both the Logistic Regression (LR) and Neural Network (NN) implementations.
4.1 Malware Detection Using Ensemble Learning
The next problem we consider is to how to use the specialized detectors to
perform overall detection performance. The problem is challenging since we do not
know the type of malware (or indeed if a program is malware) during classification. We
start with a set of general detectors, each trained using each of our features, and a set
of specialized detectors, each trained using one feature and for one malware type. The
combining problem considers how to combine the decisions of multiple detectors (base
detectors). To combine multiple base detectors, a decision function is used to fuse their
result into a final decision. Figure 4.2 illustrates the combined detector components and
overall operation.
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Figure 4.2: Overview of a combined detector; combining the decisions of multiple base
detectors using a decision function to produce a final decision
The general technique of combining multiple detectors is called ensemble learn-
ing; the classic type combines multiple independent detectors that are each trained for
the same classification problem (i.e, to classify the same phenomena) [40]. For example,
for malware detection, all the general detectors were designed to detect any type of
malware. Thus, ensemble learning techniques apply to the problem of combining their
decisions directly.
When using specialized detectors, each detector is trained to classify a different
phenomena (a different type of malware); they are each answering a different classifi-
cation question. Given that we do not know if a program contains malware, let alone
the malware type, it is not clear how specialized detectors can be used as part of a
practical detection solution. In addition, we do not know whether common ensemble
learning techniques, which assume detectors that classify the same phenomena, would
successfully combine the different specialized detectors.
In order to solve this problem, we evaluate different decision functions to com-
bine the specialized detectors. We focused on combining techniques which use all the
detectors independently in parallel to obtain the final output from the decision function.
Since all the detectors are running in parallel, this approach speeds up the computation.
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4.1.1 Decision Functions
We evaluated the following decision functions.
• Or’ing: the final decision is malware if any of the base detectors detects the input
as malware. This approach is likely to improve sensitivity, but result in a high
number of false positives (reduce specificity).
• High confidence: the final decision is selected using the Or’ing decision function.
However, in this decision function, we select the specialized detector thresholds so
that their output will be malware only when they are highly confident that the
input is a malware program. Intuitively, specialized detectors are likely to have
high confidence only when they encounter the malware type they are trained for.
• Majority voting: the final decision is based on the decision of the majority of
the base detectors. Thus, if most of them agreed that the program is a malware
the final decision will be that it is a malware program.
• Stacking (Stacked Generalization): in this approach, a number of first-level
detectors are combined using a second-level detector (meta-learner) [170]). The
key idea, is to train a second-level detector based on the output of first-level (base)
detectors via validation data set. The final decision is the output of the second
level detector.
The stacking procedure operates as follows: we from a new data set from collecting the
output of each of the base detectors using the validation set. The collected data set
consists of every base detector decision for each instance in the validation data set as
well as the true classification label (malware or regular program). In this step, it is
critical to ensure that the base detectors are formed using a batch of the training data
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set that is different from the one used to form the new data set. The second step is to
treat the new data set as a new problem, and employ a learning algorithm to solve it.
4.1.2 Ensemble Detectors
To aid with the selection of the base detectors to use within the ensemble de-
tectors, we compare the set of general detectors to each other. Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b)
show the ROC graph that compares all the LR and NN general detectors respectively.
We used a test data set that includes the test sets of all types of malware added to the
regular programs test set. The best performing LR general detector uses the INS4 fea-
ture vector and the best performing NN general detector uses the INS2 feature vector;
we used them as the baseline detectors.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Cl
as
si
ﬁc
at
io
n 
Ra
te
False Positives
MEM1
MEM2
INS1
INS2
INS3
INS4
ARCH
((a)) Logistic regression
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Cl
as
si
ﬁc
at
io
n 
Ra
te
False Positives
MEM1
MEM2
INS1
INS2
INS3
INS4
ARCH
((b)) Neural network
Figure 4.3: General detectors comparison; comparing the general detectors performance
using ROC curves
We tested different decision functions and applied as input to them different
selections of base detectors. An ROC curve based on a validation data set was generated
for each base detector to enable identification of the best threshold values for the base
detectors. Subsequently, the closest point on the ROC curve to the upper left corner
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of the graph, which represents the maximum Sensitivity+Specificity on the training
set, was use to select the threshold since we considered the sensitivity and specificity
to be equally important. However, for the High confidence decision function, the goal
is to minimize the false positives. Therefore, we selected the highest sensitivity value
achieving less than 3% false positive rate.
The validation data set used for the general detectors includes all types of
malware as well as regular programs. However, for the specialized detector, it only
includes the type of malware for which the specialized detector is designed in addition
to regular programs. We consider the following combinations of base detectors:
• General ensemble detectors: combine only general detectors using classical en-
semble learning. General ensemble detectors work best when diverse features are
selected. Therefore, we use the best detector from each feature group (INS, MEM,
and ARCH), which are INS4, MEM2, and ARCH respectively for LR detectors
and INS2, MEM2, and ARCH for NN detectors. Table 4.1 shows the threshold
values for the selected LR base detectors which achieve the best detection (highest
sum of sensitivity and specificity). The table also shows the threshold values for
the selected NN base detectors. Finally, using the same process, we find the best
threshold values for the stacking second-level detector to be 0.781 and 0.542 for
the LR and NN stacking detectors respectively.
Table 4.1: General ensemble base detectors threshold values. Threshold values, are
the values used to classify malware from regular programs based on a probability of
a program being a malware; if the probability > threshold: program is classified as
malware, else: program is classified as regular program.
INS MEM ARCH
Best Threshold (LR) 0.812 0.599 0.668
Best Threshold (NN) 0.421 0.581 0.622
High Confidence Threshold (LR) 0.893 0.927 0.885
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• Specialized ensemble detectors: these combine multiple specialized detectors. For
each malware type, we used the best specialized detector. Thus, from LR detectors,
we selected the detectors trained using MEM1 for Trojans, MEM2 for PWS, INS4
for Rogue, and INS2 for both Backdoor and Worms. On the other hand, for NN
detectors, we selected MEM2 for both PWS and Trojans, and INS2 for the other
malware types, with the threshold values shown in Table 4.2. In addition, the
threshold value for the stacking second-level detector is 0.751 and 0.597 for LR
and NN respectively.
• Mixed ensemble detector: combines one or more high performing specialized detec-
tors with one general detector. The general detector allows the detection of other
malware types unaccounted for by the base specialized detectors. This approach
allows us to control the complexity of the ensemble (by limiting the number of
specialized detectors) while taking advantage of the best specialized detectors. In
our experiments, we used two LR specialized detectors for Worms and Rogue built
using the INS4 features vector, because they performed significantly better than
the LR general detector for detecting their type. We combine these with an INS4
general detector to build the LR general ensemble detector. For the NN general
ensemble detector, we used three specialized detectors for Backdoor, PWS, and
Worm built using INS2 features vector along with an INS2 general detector. The
Table 4.2: Specialized ensemble base detectors threshold values. Threshold values, are
the values used to classify malware from regular programs based on a probability of
a program being a malware; if the probability > threshold: program is classified as
malware, else: program is classified as regular program.
Backdoor PWS Rogue Trojan Worm
Best Threshold (LR) 0.765 0.777 0.707 0.562 0.818
Best Threshold (NN) 0.473 0.337 0.180 0.760 0.269
High Confidence Threshold (LR) 0.879 0.890 0.886 0.902 0.867
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threshold values of the base detectors are shown in Table 4.3 and 4.4 for the LR
general ensemble and the NN general ensemble respectively. The threshold value
for the stacking second-level detector is 0.5 for LR general ensemble and 0.52 for
NN general ensemble.
4.1.3 Oﬄine Detection Effectiveness
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, each program have a feature instance collected
for each 10K committed instructions during execution. To evaluate the oﬄine detection
performance of a detector, a decision for each instance is first evaluated. As a proof of
concept, we consider programs where most of the decisions are malware to be malware;
otherwise, the program is considered to be a regular program.
Table 4.5 and 4.6 show the sensitivity, specificity and accuracy for the dif-
ferent LR and NN ensemble detectors using different combining decision functions. It
also presents the work and time advantage, which represent the reduction in work and
time to achieve the same detection performance as a software detector; we define these
metrics more precisely in Section 5.1. The specialized ensemble detector using the stack-
ing decision function outperforms all other detectors built using the same classification
method. The LR specialized ensemble achieves 95.8% sensitivity and only 4% false posi-
tive rate, which translates to a 24x work advantage and 12.2x time advantage compared
to software only detector. On the other hand, the NN specialized ensemble resulted in
Table 4.3: Logistic regression mixed ensemble base detectors threshold values. Thresh-
old values, are the values used to classify malware from regular programs based on a
probability of a program being a malware; if the probability > threshold: program is
classified as malware, else: program is classified as regular program.
INS4 Rogue Worm
Best Threshold 0.812 0.707 0.844
High Confidence Threshold 0.893 0.886 0.884
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Table 4.4: Neural networks mixed ensemble base detectors threshold values. Thresh-
old values, are the values used to classify malware from regular programs based on a
probability of a program being a malware; if the probability > threshold: program is
classified as malware, else: program is classified as regular program.
INS2 Backdoor PWS Worm
Best Threshold 0.421 0.473 0.870 0.269
Table 4.5: Oﬄine detection performance for multiple combined detectors that are trained
using Logistic Regression. Performance is represented as sensitivity, specificity, accuracy,
work advantage, and time advantage.
Decision Function Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy Work Advantage Time Advantage
Best General – 82.4% 89.3% 85.1% 7.7 3.5
General Ensemble
Or’ing 99.1% 13.3% 65.0% 1.1 1.1
High Confidence 80.7% 92.0% 85.1% 10.1 3.7
Majority Voting 83.3% 92.1% 86.7% 10.5 4.1
Stacking 80.7% 96.0% 86.8% 20.1 4.3
Specialized Ensemble
Or’ing 100% 5% 51.3% 1.1 1.1
High Confidence 94.4% 94.7% 94.5% 17.8 9.2
Stacking 95.8% 96.0% 95.9% 24 12.2
Mixed Ensemble
Or’ing 84.2% 70.6% 78.8% 2.9 2.2
High Confidence 83.3% 81.3% 82.5% 4.5 2.8
Stacking 80.7% 96.0% 86.7% 20.2 4.3
Table 4.6: Oﬄine detection performance for multiple combined detectors that are trained
using Neural Networks. Performance is represented as sensitivity, specificity, accuracy,
work advantage, and time advantage.
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy Work Advantage Time Advantage
Best General 88.7% 88.6% 88.3% 7.8 4.4
General Ensemble (Stacking) 83.1% 100% 91.7% ∞ 5.9
Specialized Ensemble (Stacking) 92.9% 100% 96.5% ∞ 14.1
Mixed Ensemble (Stacking) 80.2% 98.7% 89.7% 61.6 5.4
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92.9% sensitivity and 0% false positive, which translates to unbounded work advantage
and 14.1x time advantage compared to software only detector. Thus, NN specialized
ensemble have unbounded work advantage, since they have no false positives on our
dataset, and 15% faster detection than the LR specialized ensemble.
The Or’ing decision function results in poor specificity for most LR ensembles,
since it results in a false positive whenever any detector encounters one. Majority voting
was used only for LR general ensembles as it makes no sense to vote when the detectors
are voting on different questions. Majority voting performed reasonably well for the LR
general ensemble.
For the LR general ensemble detector, Stacking performs the best, slightly
improving performance relative to the baseline detector. The majority voting was almost
as accurate as stacking but results in more false positives. The mixed ensemble detector
did not perform well; with stacking, it was able to significantly improve specificity but
at low sensitivity.
4.1.4 Online Detection Effectiveness
Thus far, we have investigated the oﬄine detection success: i.e., given the full
trace of program execution. In this section, we present a moving window approach to
allow real-time classification of the malware following a design in our previous work [123].
In particular, the features are collected for each 10,000 committed instructions, and
classified using the detector. We keep track of the decision of the detector using an
approximation of Exponential Moving Weighted Average. During a window of time of
32 consecutive decisions, if the decision of the detector reflects malware with an average
that crosses a preset threshold, we classify the program as malware.
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Online detection performance
Table 4.7: Online detection performance for multiple combined detectors that are trained
using Logistic Regression. Performance is represented as sensitivity, specificity, and
accuracy.
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
Best General 84.2% 86.6% 85.1%
General Ensemble (Stacking) 77.1% 94.6% 84.1%
Specialized Ensemble (Stacking) 92.9% 92.0% 92.3%
Mixed Ensemble (Stacking) 85.5% 90.1% 87.4%
Table 4.8: Online detection performance for multiple combined detectors that are trained
using Neural Networks. Performance is represented as sensitivity, specificity, and accu-
racy.
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
Best General 89.2% 85.6% 86.9%
General Ensemble (Stacking) 91.6% 89.9% 90.6%
Specialized Ensemble (Stacking) 93.2% 94.4% 93.8%
Mixed Ensemble (Stacking) 94.4% 89.8% 91.7%
The result of the online detection performance are in Table 4.7 and 4.8. We
evaluate candidate detectors in the online detection scenario. The performance for LR
detectors is slightly worse for online detection than oﬄine detection, which benefits
from the full program execution history. However, for the NN detectors the sensitivity
increased, but the specificity and accuracy decreased. The NN specialized ensemble
using the stacking decision function outperforms all other detectors by detecting 93.2%
of the malware with only 5.6% of false alarms.
Online detection time
Next, we study the time for detecting a malware program in the hardware
detector during execution. This time is defined as the number of decision windows
(10K committed instructions) that a detector took since a malware started running to
classify it as malware. Figure 4.4 shows the cumulative probability distribution of the
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detected malware programs as a function of the number of decision windows for both
specialized ensemble detectors LR and NN. NN clearly outperforms LR in this metric.
For example, NN detects 88% of malware in 500 periods or less, while LR only detects
7%, and over 95% of the malware in 1000 periods or less, while LR detects less than 60%.
On average, NN detected malware 5x faster than LR. On a 3 GHz processor, assuming
an Instruction Per Cycle (IPC) of 2, this translates to around 500 µ-seconds for NN
compared to around 2.5 milliseconds for LR. Thus, NN detectors can alert the software
detector more quickly, and limit the opportunity the malware has to do damage to the
system.
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Figure 4.4: Online detection time; time it takes to detect a malwre during it’s execu-
tion. This Figure shows the cumulative probability distribution of the detected malware
programs as a function of the number of decision windows for both specialized ensemble
detectors Logistic Regression and Neural Networks.
4.2 Hardware Implementation
We design the ensemble detector using 5 major pipeline stages (shown in Fig-
ure 4.5) each of these stages is further pipelined. The first stage of the pipeline (feature
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Figure 4.5: Overview of the ensemble malware detection framework attached to the
commit stage of the pipeline.
collection) performs feature extraction on the instructions being committed from the tail
end of the processor pipeline. For example, the INS4 feature is collected by examining
the opcodes of committed instructions and outputting the instruction category to the
next stage of the pipeline.
The second stage of the pipeline (feature transform) performs context aware
transformation on the raw feature information. For instance, INS2 is generated by taking
the INS4 feature and echoing the specific feature if it has not yet been committed during
the current detection cycle, transforming it from an integer feature to a binary one. The
division of feature collection and feature transform reduces the need for multiple highly
similar feature collection units.
The third stage consists of the base detectors (neural networks or perceptrons).
Perceptrons require minimal hardware investment [123].This low overhead is achievable
51
because perceptrons can be optimized into a single accumulator, feature weight look
up table and a comparison (Figure 4.6).Typically, perceptrons typical operate using the
following formula:

1 if W¯ · X¯ + b > 0
0 otherwise
where W¯ is the weights vector, X¯ is the feature vector, and b is the bias.
However, as we commit only 1 feature per cycle we can perform the dot product without
actually ever doing a multiply by initializing an accumulator to b then accumulating the
weight of each feature when it is committed. Unfortunately, neural networks can not be
optimized in the same way. Neural networks require a full multiply accumulate loop and
a sigmoid function for each neuron in the network. This causes neural networks to have
a significantly higher hardware overhead (as high as 25x for this stage) as compared to
perceptrons. Therefore, despite there is an interesting complexity performance trade-off
between LR and NN.
Figure 4.6: Optimized perceptron hardware implementation.
The fourth stage takes the outputs of the base detectors and combines them to
form a single prediction. As mentioned in Section 4.1 we explored a number of different
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methods for combining the outputs of the base detectors, all of which are simple to
implement in hardware. For instance, the most powerful and complex decision function,
stacking, can be implemented as a look up table as the number base detectors is small.
For example, in our implementation we perform stacking on 5 detectors, using a single
32 bit register to hold all the possible outputs.
Finally, in the fifth stage, time series analysis of the decision function is per-
formed to increase the specificity of the model. In our implementation we use a windowed
moving average model. More complex models such as an auto-regressive integrated mov-
ing average could possibly provide better results but require a larger hardware budget.
We used the Quartus 2 17.1 software to synthesize implementation of the en-
semble detectors attached to the commit stage of the processor pipeline on an DE2-115
FPGA board [1]. Our complete implementation using perceptrons requires a minimal
hardware investment. Taking up only 2.88% of logic cells on the core and using only
1.53% of the power compared to an open source processor [4]. Figure 4.7 shows the
FPGA layout of the implementation integrated to the processor. The implementation
was functionally validated to collect features and classify them correctly. While the
detector may be lightweight in terms of physical resources, the implementation required
a 9.83% slow down of frequency. However, while this may seem high, the vast majority
of this overhead comes from collecting the MEM feature vectors; when we do not collect
this feature, the reduction in frequency was under 2%. If feature collection was pipelined
over more cycles this cost be significantly reduced or eliminated.
We also note that the area overheads are relative to a small in-order core [4];
compared to a modern core with caches the overhead is likely to be negligible. The
frequency overheads are based on the FPGA implementation of the detectors which are
known not to correspond directly to delays incurred in a custom implementation of the
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logic [95].
Figure 4.7: FPGA layout of EnsembleHMD integrated into AO486 processor core.
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Figure 5.1: Building accurate HMDs project overview
After confirming the advantage of building specialized ensemble detectors in
both oﬄine and online detection in terms of accuracy, in this Chapter, we wanted to
explore other advantages. In particular, the advantage of ensemble HMDs in a two-
level detection system with a more accurate software detector. This advantage can’t
be directly measured by accuracy: if accuracy were the only metric, we are better off
using the software detector alone. The advantage of HMDs result from reducing the
overhead necessary for software detection and from prioritizing the efforts of a software
detector. To better measure this advantage, we develop metrics that translate detec-
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tion performance of HMDs to overhead and time-to-detection advantages of the whole
system (Section 5.1). Our ensemble approaches substantially improve the detection of
HMDs, reducing the false positives by over half for our best configurations, while also
significantly improving the detection rate. As a result, we achieve over 16x reduction
in overhead of the two-level detection framework compared to a software only detector.
Compared to using a single HMD detector [123, 124], the ensemble detector achieves
2x reduction in overhead and 2.7x reduction in time to detection of the system during
online detection.
Furthermore, The paper next conducts a longitudinal study to explore whether
detectors trained on a set of malware continue to be effective over time as malware
evolves (Section 5.2). We discover that the detection performance degrades substantially,
motivating the need for a secure update facility to allow the detector configuration to
be updated as malware evolves.
In summary, in this chapter, we define metrics for the two-level detection frame-
work that translate detection performance to expected reduction in overhead, and time
to detection. Moreover, we explore the question of whether detectors trained on an old
generation of malware would continue to successfully detect malware as it evolves (i.e.,
from a more recent data set). We discover that the classification performance signifi-
cantly deteriorates as malware evolves. In addition, we checked if detectors trained on
recent malware would be able to detect old malware and the answer was no. These
results highlight the need to continuously and securely adapt the learning configuration
of the detector to track evolving malware.
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5.1 Two-level Framework Performance
We envision our HMD to be used as a first level of a two-level detection (TLD)
system. The advantage of this approach is that the second level can clean up false
positives that arise due to the fact that the HMD uses low level features and simple
classifiers. The hardware detector is always on, identifying processes that are likely to
be malware to prioritize the second level. The second level could consist of a more
sophisticated semantic detector, or even a protection mechanism, such as a Control
Flow Integrity (CFI) monitor [183] or a Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [163] monitor,
that prevents a suspicious process from overstepping its boundaries. An interesting
possibility is to make the second level detector a cloud based system; if malware is found
the results can be propagated to other subscribers in the system. The first level thus
serves to prioritize the operation of the second level so that the available resources are
directed at processes that are suspicious, rather than applied arbitrarily to all processes.
One possible design point is to use a software only malware detector (i.e.,
make the second level always on). This detector is likely to be more accurate, but
unfortunately, it also incurs high overhead. Thus, the advantage of the HMD is to
prioritize the operation of the second level detector to lower its overhead, and reduce
the detection time. Improving the detection accuracy of the hardware detector can
substantially improve the overall system. Reducing false negatives will lead to the
detection of more malware, while reducing false positives will reduce the overhead of the
system by avoiding unnecessary invocations of the second level detector.
The performance of an HMD in terms of classification accuracy on its own
does not reflect the advantage of using it within a TLD (detection overhead and time
to detection). To be able to quantify these advantages, in this section we build a model
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of the two level detector and derive approximate metrics to measure its performance
advantage relative to a system consisting of software protection only. Our goal is to
evaluate how improvements in detection translate to run-time advantages for the de-
tection system. Without loss of generality, we assume that the second level consists of
a software detector that can perfectly classify malware from normal programs, but the
model can be adapted to consider other scenarios as well.
The first level uses low-level architecture features of the running programs
to classify them. This classification may be binary (suspicious or not suspicious) or
more continuous, providing a classification confidence value. In this analysis, we assume
binary classification: if the hardware detector flags a program to be suspicious it will be
added to a priority work list. The software detector scans processes in the high priority
list first. A detector providing a suspicion index can provide finer prioritization of the
software classifier, further improving the detection advantage.
5.1.1 Assumptions and Basic Models
We call the percentage of positive instances correctly classified malware, Sensi-
tivity (S) of the classifier. Similarly, we call the percentage of correctly classified normal
programs the Specificity (C). Conversely, the misclassified malware is referred to as
False Negatives - FN, while the misclassified normal programs are referredto as False
Positives -FP. For a classification algorithm to be effective, it is important to have high
values of both S and C.
We assume a discrete system where the arrival rate of processes is N with
a fraction m of those being malware. We also assume that the effort that the system
allocates to the software scanner is sufficient to scan a fraction e of the arriving processes
(e ranges from 0 to 1).
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In the base case a software detector scans a set of running programs that are
equally likely to be malware. Thus, given a detection effort budget e, a corresponding
fraction of the arriving programs can be covered. Increasing the detection budget will al-
low the scanner to evaluate more processes. Since every process has an equal probability
of being malware, increasing the effort increases the detection percentage proportion-
ately. Thus, the detection effectiveness (expected fraction of detected malware) is simply
e.
5.1.2 Metrics to Assess Relative Performance of TLD
In a TLD, the hardware detector informs the system of suspected malware,
which is used to create a priority list consisting of these processes. The size of this
suspect list, ssuspect, as a fraction of the total number of processes is:
ssuspect = S ·m+ (1− C) · (1−m) (5.1)
Intuitively, the suspect list size is the fraction of programs predicted to be malware. It
consists of the fraction of malware that were successfully predicted to be malware (S ·m)
and the fraction of normal programs erroneously predicted to be malware (1−C)·(1−m).
Work advantage
Consider a case where the scanning effort e is limited to be no more than the
size of the priority list. In this range, the advantage of the TLD can be derived as follows.
Lets assume that the effort the system dedicates to detection is k · ssuspect where k is
some fraction between 0 and 1 inclusive. The expected fraction of detected malware for
the baseline case is simply the effort, which is k · ssuspect (as discussed in the previous
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subsection). In contrast, we know that S of the malware can be expected to be in the
ssuspect list and the success rate of the TLD is k · S. Therefore, the advantage, Wtld, in
detection rate for the combined detector in this range is the ratio of the detection of the
TLD to the software baseline:
Wtld =
k · S
k · ssuspect =
S
S ·m+ (1− C) · (1−m) (5.2)
The advantage of the TLD is that the expected ratio of malware in the suspect
list is higher than that in the general process list if the classifier is better than random.
It is interesting to note that when S+C=1, the advantage is 1 (i.e., both systems are
the same); to get an advantage, S+C must be greater than 1. For example, for small
m, if S=C=0.75, the advantage is 3 (the proposed system finds malware with one third
of the effort of the baseline). If S=C=0.85 (lower than the range that our features are
obtaining), the advantage grows to over 5.
Note that with a perfect hardware predictor (S=1, C=1), the advantage in
the limit is 1m ; thus, the highest advantage is during a period where the system has no
malware when m approaches 0. Under such a scenario, the advantage tends to S1−C .
However, as m increases, for imperfect detectors, the size of the priority list is affected
in two ways: it gets larger because more malware processes are predicted to be malware
(true positives), but it also gets smaller, because less processes are normal, and therefore
less are erroneously predicted to be malware (false positives). For a scenario with a high
level of attack (m tending to 1) there is no advantage to the system as all processes are
malware and a priority list, even with perfect detection, does not improve on arbitrary
scanning.
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Detection success given a finite effort
In this metric, we assume a finite amount of work, and compute the expected
fraction of detected malware. Given enough resources to scan a fraction a of arriving
processes, we attempt to determine the probability of detecting a particular infection.
We assume a strategy where the baseline detector scans the processes in arbi-
trary order (as before) while the TLD scans the suspect list first, and then, if there are
additional resources, it scans the remaining processes in arbitrary order.
When e <= ssuspect, analysis similar to that above shows the detection ad-
vantage to be ( Sssuspect ). When e >= ssuspect, then the detection probability can be
computed as follows.
Dtld = S + (1− S) · e ·N −N · ssuspect
N · (1− ssuspect) . (5.3)
The first part of the expression (S) means that if the suspect list is scanned, the proba-
bility of detecting a particular infection is S (that it is classified correctly and therefore
is in the suspect list). However, if the malware is misclassified (1-S), malware could
be detected if it is picked to be scanned given the remaining effort. The expression
simplifies to:
Dtld = S +
(1− S) · (e− ssuspect)
1− ssuspect (5.4)
Note that the advantage in detection can be obtained by dividing Dtld by Dbaseline which
is simply e.
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Time to Detection
Finally, we derive the expected time to detect a malware given an effort suf-
ficient to scan all programs. Please note that this metric, which quantifies the time
for detection in the overall system including the second level detector, differs from the
detection time metric introduced in Section 4.1.4 which refers to the time of detection
within the hardware detector. In the baseline, the expected value of the time to detect
for a given malware is 12 of the scan time. In contrast, with the TLD, the expected
detection time is:
Ttld = S · ssuspect
2
+ (1− S) · (ssuspect + (1− ssuspect)
2
), (5.5)
The first part of the expression accounts for S of the malware which are correctly
classified as malware. For these programs, the average detection time is half of the
size of the suspect list. The remaining (1-S) malware which are misclassified have a
detection time equal to the time to scan the suspect list (since that is scanned first),
followed by half the time to scan the remaining processes. Simplifying the equation, we
obtain:
Ttld = S · ssuspect
2
+ (1− S) · ((1 + ssuspect)
2
), (5.6)
Recalling that Tbaseline =
1
2 , the advantage in detection time, which is the ratio
Ttld
Tbaseline
is:
Tadvantage = S · ssuspect + (1− S) · (1 + ssuspect), (5.7)
substituting for ssuspect and simplifying, we obtain:
Tadvantage =
1
1− (1−m)(C + S − 1) (5.8)
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The advantage again favors the TLD only when the sum of C and S exceeds 1 (the area
above the 45 degree line in the ROC graph. Moreover, the advantage is higher when
m is small (peace-time) and lower when m grows. When m tends to 0, if C+S = 1.5,
malware is detected in half the time on average. If the detection is better (say C+S =
1.8), malware can be detected 5 times faster on average. We will use these metrics to
evaluate the success of the TLD based on the Sensitivity and Specificity derived from
the hardware classifiers that we implemented.
5.1.3 Evaluating Two Level Detection Overhead
Next, we use the metrics introduced in this section to analyze the performance
and the time-to-detect advantage of the TLD systems based on the different hardware
detectors we investigated. We also use them to understand the advantage obtained from
increasing the detection accuracy using our ensemble techniques.
The time and work advantages for LR detectors are depicted in Figure 5.2(a)
and 5.2(b) as the percentage of malware processes increases. The average time to detect
for the LR specialized ensemble detector is 6.6x faster than the software only detector
when the fraction of malware programs is low. This advantage drops as more malware
is encountered in the system; for example, when 10% of the programs are malware
(m=0.1), these advantages drop to 4.2x. We observe that the LR specialized ensemble
detector has the best average time-to-detection among LR detectors. The amount of
work required for detection is improved by 11x by the LR specialized ensemble detector
compared to using the software detector only. Although the LR general ensemble de-
tector had a 14x improvement due to the reduction in the number of false positives, its
detection rate is significantly lower than that of the LR specialized ensemble due to its
lower sensitivity.
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Figures 5.2(c) and 5.2(d) shows the time and work advantage for the NN de-
tectors. The NN specialized ensemble detector outperforms all other detectors with an
average time for detection 8x faster than software only detector (1.2x faster than the
LR specialized ensemble detector) when the fraction of malware is low. For the same
detector, the the work advantage was 16.6x compared to the software detector. This
advantage is 1.4x better than the LR specialized ensemble detector.
5.2 Resilience to Malware Evolution
In this section, we study the questions: (1) is a detector trained on a malware
training set effective in detecting malware that emerges in the future? If the answer is
yes, then there is no need to continue to update the detector to reflect malware evolution.
Conversely, if the answer is no, there is a need for a secure mechanism to update the
training of the detector over time, even for a hardware-supported detector such as the
ones we are studying. (2) When malware evolve, will they insert additional features to
the existing ones or they will use different features? These two question were answered
for android malwre feature space [5], and we are interested in studying them in the
low-level feature space.
To answer the first question, we use two malware sets with a 4 years difference
in the constituent malware. Specifically, we train seven detectors using data sets for
malware found in 2009, corresponding to the different feature vectors. We evaluate the
malware using two testing data sets: one that contains only malware found in 2009 and
another that contains only malware found in 2013.
Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b) show the ROC curves using the old and new gen-
erations of malware respectively. Examining these figures, it is clear that classification
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Figure 5.2: Online detection performance, in terms of time and work advantage as a
function of malware rate, for different combined detectors and different training algo-
rithms (Logistic Regression and Neural Networks).
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Figure 5.3: Malware evolution; detection performance of detectors trained using old
malware in detecting new malware and vice versa.
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performance of the detectors trained on the old malware significantly deteriorates when
applied to recent malware. Thus, it is essential to develop mechanisms to securely
update the hardware detector (e.g., by updating the θ weights vector for the logistic
regression) to continue to track the evolution of malware. This secure update can be
integrated our system using microcode update function that is used by Intel and other
processor manufacturer.
To answer the second question, we used the 2013 malware in training the
detectors and the 2009 malware in testing. This detector is used to test if recent malware
have representatives features of older malware. The resulting ROC curves is shown in
Figure 5.3(c). The results clearly show that using recent malware in training the detector
can’t detect older malware effectively. Therefore, Figure 5.3(d) show the results when
both the 2013 and 2009 datasets are used in both training and testing. The results
emphasize the importance of including recent and old malware in the training set of low-
level detectors to make sure that they are effective in detecting malware when deployed.
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Figure 6.1: Building evasion-resilience HMDs project overview
At a time when malware developers appear to have the upper hand over de-
fenders, as we show in the perivous chapters (Chapters 3, 4, 5) hardware supported
malware detection can offer a substantial advantage to defenders because it is always
on and has little impact on performance or power [122, 125, 83, 84, 80].
Should HMDs become widely deployed? it is natural to expect that attackers
will attempt to evade detection. Therefore, in this chapter and the following chapter
(Chapter 7), we explore whether attackers can adapt malware to continue to operate
while avoiding detection by HMDs. Intuitively, it should be possible for the attacker
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to evade detection if there are no restrictions placed on them, by running a mostly
normal program and advancing the attack very slowly. However, we assume that the
attacker would like to minimize the impact on the malware execution time since some
attacks are time sensitive (e.g., covert and side-channels [30, 63, 129, 75, 47, 115]) or
computationally intensive (e.g., Spam or Click Fraud [42, 168]). We describe the threat
model and limitations in Section 6.1.
We approach the question of whether malware can evade HMD in the following
steps:
1. In this chapter, we will answer the question: Can HMDs be reverse-engineered?
Recent results in adversarial classification [162] imply that arbitrarily complex
but deterministic classifiers can be reverse-engineered. We confirm that this is
the case for HMDs by reverse-engineering a number of detectors under realistic
assumptions. We describe our dataset and methodology in Section 6.2, and present
and analyze the reverse-engineered detectors in Section 6.3.
2. In Chapter 7, having a model of the detector, can malware developers modify
malware to avoid detection? Evading the detection by changing the behavior of
the malware is known as mimicry attacks [21, 165]. We show (in Section 7.1)
that existing HMDs can be rendered ineffective using simple modifications to the
malware binary.
3. Finally, in Chapter 8, after showing that the current generation of HMDs is vul-
nerable to evasion, we explore whether new HMDs can be constructed that are
robust to evasion. In particular, we propose in Section 8.1 a new resilient HMD
(RHMD) organization that uses multiple diverse detectors and switches between
them unpredictably. We show that RHMDs that use even simple base detectors
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are resilient to both reverse-engineering and evasion. Furthermore, this resilience
increases with the number and diversity of the base detectors.
The problem of evasive malware detection has been considered in the context
of software malware detectors [165, 21, 149]. Moreover, some existing HMD proposals
discuss the possibility of malware evasion [38, 76]. However, ours is the first study that
explores this important question regarding HMDs in detail and develops solutions to
it. We note that while our experiments target HMDs, the underlying evasion problem
exists in the context of any adversarial classification problem [162]. Our work advances
the state of the art in general, not just for HMDs: we show systematically that reverse-
engineering is possible (Chapter 6), we develop techniques that use the result of reverse-
engineered detectors to efficiently evade detection (Chapter 7), and we introduce evade-
retrain games and study their resilience to evasion.
In summary, in this chapter, we show that it is possible to accurately reverse
engineer HMDs, regardless of their complexity.
6.1 Threat Model and Limitations
We assume an adversarial attack model which starts with the adversary at-
tempting to reverse engineer the classifier (figure out the decision boundaries of the
model that is used for detection). We assume that the attacker has access to a machine
with a similar detector as the victim machine. This allows the attacker to observe the
behavior of the classifier for given programs (whether malware or normal programs).
With a model of the detector, the attacker can attempt to generate evading malware
that hide themselves by changing some of their characteristics (feature values). Such
evading mechanism is known as mimicry attacks [21, 165], which can be in the form
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of no-op insertion, code obfuscation by the attackers, or calling benign functions in the
middle of the malicious payload [74].
We assume that the attacker that undertakes malware rewriting as part of
a mimicry attack is interested in maintaining reasonable performance of the malware.
If this assumption is not true, an attacker can simply run a normal program with
embedded malware, that advances the malware program arbitrarily slow (e.g., 1 malware
instruction every N normal instructions where N is arbitrarily large), making detection
impossible. Note that this is a limitation of all anomaly detectors, and not only HMDs.
This assumption is also reasonable for important segments of malware such as: malware
that is time sensitive (e.g., that performs covert or side-channel attacks [129, 75, 47, 115])
and malware that is computationally intensive such as that executing on botnets being
monetized under a pay-per-install model [22] (e.g., Spam bots or Click fraud). Such
malware have a utility to the malware writer proportional to their performance.
6.2 Data and Methodology
We collected samples of malware (from the MalwareDB malware set [118]) and
normal programs to use in our study. The downloaded malware data set consisted of
3000 malware programs. For regular program samples, we used Windows programs since
the malware programs that we use are Windows-based. The regular program set con-
tains a variety of applications including browsers, text editing tools, system programs,
SPEC 2006 benchmarks [56], and other popular applications such as Acrobat Reader,
Notepad++, and Winrar. In total, the non-malware data set contains 554 programs.
Both malware and regular programs data sets were divided into 60% victim training,
20% attacker training for the reverse engineered detector, and 20% attacker testing of
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the detector. To ensure that there is no bias in the distribution of malware programs
across the sets, each set includes a randomly selected subset of malware samples from
each type of malware in the overall data set.
The data was collected by running both malware and regular programs on a
virtual machine with a Windows 7 operating system. To allow malware programs to
carry out their intended functionality, the Windows security services and firewall were
disabled. Furthermore, the dynamic trace of executed programs was collected using
Pin instrumentation tool [34]. Unlike mobile malware where many malware samples
require user interaction and necessitate special efforts to ensure correct behavior [77],
we observed that the vast majority of our windows/desktop malware operated correctly
(through manual inspection and examination malware behavior during run-time); sev-
eral malware samples tripped the intrusion detection monitoring systems on our network
as they attempted to discover and attack other machines, until we separated the envi-
ronment into an independent subnet.
The collected trace duration for each executed program was 5000 system calls
or 15 million of committed instructions, starting after a warm-up period, whichever is
reached first. While ideally, we would have liked to run each program longer, we are
limited by the computational overhead; since we are collecting run-time behavior of the
programs using dynamic profiling information through Pin within a virtual machine,
collection requires several weeks of execution on a small cluster and produces several
terabytes of compressed profiling traces. Training and testing are also extremely com-
putationally intensive. We believe that this data set is sufficiently large to establish the
feasibility and provide trustworthy experimental results.
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We collected different feature vectors, specifically:
• Executed instruction mixes (called Instructions in the rest of the paper): this
feature tracks the frequency of instructions that show the most different frequency
(delta) between normal programs and malware in the training set;
• Memory address patterns (called Memory in the rest of the paper): this feature
tracks the distribution of memory references organized in bins based on the address
difference between consecutive memory accesses; and
• Architectural events (called Architectural in the rest of the paper): tracks the
numbers of different architectural events occurring in an execution period such as
unaligned memory accesses, and taken branches.
These features are modeled after those used in prior HMD studies [38, 122].
6.3 Reverse-Engineering HMDs
In this section, we demonstrate that we can successfully reverse-engineer HMDs
based on supervised learning (e.g., similar to those presented by Demme et al. [38], Ozsoy
et al. [122], and some of the detectors used by Kazdagli et al. [77]). Reverse-engineering
the malware detector allows the adversary to construct a model of the HMD. The model
is necessary to be able to methodically develop evasive malware. We assume that the
adversary has the ability to query the targeted detector; if they do not, the problem
becomes NP-Hard [162].
Figure 6.2(a) shows the steps in reverse-engineering a detector. First, the
adversary prepares a training data set that is composed of both regular and malware
programs: this is a separate data set from the one used to train the classifier, which is
unknown to the attacker. Next, the adversary uses this data set to query the victim
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((a)) Reverse-engineering of victim
((b)) Evaluating reverse-engineered detector
Figure 6.2: Overview of reverse-engineering the HMDs process as well as the process of
evaluating the reverse-engineered detector.
detector and records the victim’s detection decisions. The decisions are used as the label
for the data as we construct the reverse-engineered detector. Finally, the adversary may
use different machine learning classification algorithms trained with the labeled data to
build the new reverse-engineered detector.
Figure 6.2(b) shows the evaluation of the reverse-engineered detector. The
adversary first prepares an attacker testing data set as described above. Next, both the
original detector and reverse-engineered detector are queried using the attacker testing
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data set. Finally, the percentage of equivalent decisions made by the two detectors is
calculated. Note that from the adversary point of view, it does not matter if the detector
is classifying malware and regular programs correctly; rather, the attacker desires to
mimic the classification of the victim detector and it evaluates success on that basis.
For most of our studies, we evaluate baseline detectors that use logistic regres-
sion (LR) and neural networks (NN); the methodology naturally generalizes to other
classification algorithms. We implemented the NN classifier as a multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) with a single hidden layer that has a number of neurons equal to the number
of features in the feature vector. We use the tanh function as the activation function.
The rationale for selecting these two algorithms is that prior studies showed that LR
performs well and has low complexity, facilitating hardware implementations [122]. NN
features more complex classification ability, capable of producing a non-linear classi-
fication boundary. These detectors allow us to contrast the impact of the detector
complexity on both reverse-engineering process and mimicry attacks. For some studies,
we use other classifiers to illustrate some generalizations of our conclusions.
The victim data set is used to train different detector instances using each of
the two algorithms for each of the three different features, resulting in six detectors.
The detectors take a feature vector as an input in order to produce a 0 or 1 decision
indicating whether the program is a regular or malware program respectively.
Figure 6.3 shows the performance of the detectors in classifying malware and
regular programs using area under the curve (AUC) and the accuracy of the classifica-
tion metrics for each of the detectors. Note that this figure shows the performance of
the baseline HMD which we will be attempting to reverse-engineer. AUC is the area
under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve which plots the sensitivity
of the detector against the percentage of false positives; the larger the AUC, the better
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Figure 6.3: Performance of individual detectors (general detectors) for different feature
vectors. Performance is represented using AUC values and Accuracy.
the classification. Accuracy refers to the point on the ROC which maximizes the accu-
racy (percentage of decisions that are made correctly). It is a more direct measure of
performance since the HMD classification threshold will be typically set to perform at
or near this optimal point.
We assume that the attacker does not know the details of how the target victim
detector was trained. Thus, they do not know important configuration parameters of
the detector including: (1) the size of the instruction window that is used to collect the
features; the detector collects the feature over a collection window, typically measured
in thousands of instructions, and then uses these features for classification; (2) the
specific feature used for the classification. However, we assume that the attacker has a
set of candidate features that includes the feature used by the target detector; and (3)
the classification algorithm used by the target detector. Importantly, the attacker has
access to a machine with a similar detector so they can test hypotheses and evaluate the
success of the mimicry attacks. Next, we show how the attacker can reverse-engineer
the detection period and the features used in training the target detector.
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6.3.1 Target Detector Classification Period
The classification period refers to the size of the instruction window used to
collect the classification features. Prior work [38] has shown that a classification period
of about 10K instructions works well for supervised learning classifiers, but a detector
may be trained with a different classification period. For this experiment, we used a
classifier built using the Instruction mix feature which we assume the attacker knows
(later we relax this assumption). The target detector collection period is 10K. We
prepare multiple pairs of attacker testing and training datasets, using different collection
periods. Next, we train a reverse-engineered detector using different data sets and
evaluate its accuracy. For each of the attacker data sets, we construct three reverse
engineered detectors using three different machine learning algorithms, which are: LR,
decision tree (DT), and support vector machine (SVM). The results of this experiments
are shown in Figure 6.4(a). The results show that the highest accuracy for reverse-
engineering for each of the machine learning algorithms used is when the collection
period is the same as the victim’s collection period (10K). Thus, by using an experiment
such as this one, the attacker can infer the victim’s collection period.
6.3.2 Target Detector Feature
Malware detectors can be built using different features. In this subsection, we
explore the possibility of reverse-engineering the feature vector used by the victim de-
tector only by querying the victim detector. We use a detector based on the Instruction
mix feature with a classification window of 10K instructions. We prepared multiple
pairs of attacker testing and training data sets using the same collection period (10K),
but using different feature vectors. Next, we construct reverse-engineered detectors us-
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Figure 6.4: Reverse-engineer victim detector configurations: (a) collection period and
(b) feature vector
ing the attacker training data sets labeled with the output from the victim detector as
malware or regular program. For each of the attacker data sets, we constructed three
detectors using different machine learning algorithms, which are: LR, Decision Tree
(DT), and Support Vector Machine (SVM). The results of this experiment are shown in
Figure 6.4(b). The results show that the highest accuracy is achieved when the feature
vector is the same as the victim’s feature vector (Instructions). We conclude that the
victim HMD features can be successfully reverse-engineered.
Note that at the correct value of the feature and period, it is possible to obtain
0-error reverse-engineering in our experiments. This is consistent with results from PAC
learning theory which we overview in Section 8.2. Although we showed how to sepa-
rately reverse-engineer the classification period (assuming that the classification feature
is known) and the classification feature (assuming the classification period is known), we
can also jointly reverse-engineer them both. The process involves constructing detectors
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with different classification features and periods, and finding the detector that maximizes
the reverse-engineering accuracy.
6.3.3 Performance of Reverse-engineered HMD
In the next set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of the reverse-
engineered detectors. We reverse-engineer LR and NN detectors, but the reverse-
engineered detector is constructed using three different machine learning algorithms,
which are LR, Decision Trees (DT), and NN. The results for reverse-engineering of the
LR and NN detectors are shown in Figure 6.5(a) and Figure 6.5(b) respectively. The
results show that NN can reverse-engineer both types of detectors with high accuracy
(e.g., less than 1% error for all features for LR). The performance is somewhat lower for
NN since the separation criteria used in the classification is more complex and there-
fore more difficult to reverse-engineer accurately.As can be expected, the simpler linear
detector (LR) cannot effectively capture the non-linear behavior of NN, consistent with
PAC learning theory as we discuss in Section 8.2.
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Figure 6.5: Reverse-engineering efficiency; accuracy of reverse-engineering the victim
detectors using different machine learning algorithms.
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Figure 7.1: Building evasion-resilience HMDs project overview
After confirming that HMDs can be reverse-engineered effectively, in this chap-
ter we will explore creating evasive samples of malware using the reverse engineering
information. In particular, having a model of the detector, can malware developers
modify malware to avoid detection? Evading the detection by changing the behavior
of the malware is known as mimicry attacks [21, 165]. We show (in Section 7.1) that
existing HMDs can be rendered ineffective using simple modifications to the malware
binary.
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As a first step to find a solution for the evasion problem, we have tried to
retrain the HMDs using evasive samples to see if they can generalize to detect evasive
malware. Therefore, we tried to answer the question: Can the malware evade detection
even if the detector is retrained with some samples of the evasive malware? We show in
Section 7.2 that for simple evasion strategies that can fool a given detector, retraining
a logistic regression (LR) detector does not result in effective classification of evasive
malware, unless the detection performance on normal malware is sacrificed. On the other
hand, more sophisticated detectors such as Neural Networks (NN) can be successfully
retrained, but the attacker is still able to reverse-engineer the retrained detector and
evade it again.
In summary, in this chapter, we show that once an HMD has been reverse
engineered, malware can effectively evade it using low overhead evasion strategies. This
result brings into question the effectiveness of existing HMDs. Furthermore, we show
that simple linear HMDs such as LR cannot be retrained to adapt to evasive malware.
More complex classifiers such as NN can adapt better but may break down after several
generations of evasion and retrain. Moreover, new malware can still reverse-engineer
and evade even such classifiers.
7.1 Developing Evasive Malware
After reverse-engineering the victim detectors, the next step that attackers are
likely to take is to develop systematic transformations of their malware that can evade
detection by these detectors. The malware developers may modify their malware in any
way, to attempt to produce behavior in the feature space of the detector that causes
them to be classified as normal. Possible strategies to accomplish this goal include using
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polymorphism to produce different binaries [179], or adding instructions that do not
affect the malware state.
Figure 7.2: Methodology for generating evasive malware (an overview).
Since we are working with actual malware binaries, we do not have the source
available to apply general transformations. Moreover, most of the malware is obfuscated
making decompilation difficult and challenge binary rewriting tools. To address these
challenges, we developed a methodology to dynamically insert instructions into the
malware execution in a controllable way (Figure 7.2). In particular, we construct the
Dynamic Control Flow Graph (DCFG) of the malware by instrumenting it through the
PIN tool [34]. Next, we add instructions into the control flow graph in a way that does
not affect the execution state of the program.
The injected instructions must change feature vector in a controlled way based
on the reversed-engineered classifier to attempt to move the malware across the classifi-
cation decision boundary to be classified as normal. For the Instruction feature, injection
of opcodes increases the weight of the corresponding feature directly. For the memory
feature, insertion of load and store instructions with controlled distances changes the
histogram of memory reference frequencies. For architectural features, the effects may
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not be directly controllable. For example, increasing the cache hit rate or the branch
predictor success rate requires inserting code segments that will generate cache misses or
predictable branches respectively. Without loss of generality, all of our experiments use
the instruction feature. When attempting to change multiple features, the evasion code
must combine these strategies (for example, alternating their use at different injection
points).
We explored two approaches for inserting the instructions: (1) Block level:
insert instructions before every control flow altering instruction. Note that the instruc-
tions inserted at that point in the program are executed every time that control flow
instruction is reached (i.e., we do not change the instructions that are injected at a par-
ticular point in the program, once they are injected); and (2) Function level: we insert
instructions before every return instruction.
Random instruction injection: Although we do not expect this strategy to succeed,
we first check if injecting randomly chosen instructions in the malware programs is suf-
ficient to evade detection to establish that the injection must be specific to the detector.
Each malware program data set is divided into two sets based on whether the victim
detector successfully detected them without modification. Each of the data sets is mod-
ified using our framework to inject the additional instructions and retested; the results
are shown in Figure 7.3. Clearly, injecting random instructions at the basic block level
or at the function call level does not help in evading detection.
Reverse-engineering driven instruction injection: The next set of strategies we
use is to exploit the information in the structure of the reverse-engineered detector to
attempt to avoid detection. Ideally, we would like to make the malware appear close to
regular programs in terms of behavior so that the detector cannot successfully identify
it. Based on the parameters of the reverse-engineered detector (from Section 6.3), we
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Figure 7.3: Detection performance of evasive malware created using random instruction
injection
form a strategy for which instructions we can inject to make the detection difficult.
To understand the rationale behind the instruction selection, we must explain
some details about the operation of LR. LR is defined by a vector θ that identifies the
linear separation between the points being classified. The weights of the elements of the
vector determine the relative importance of these elements. Since we are only adding
instructions, we pick the instructions whose weights are negative to move the malware
towards the other side of the separation line. In this first strategy, we inject only the
instruction with the least weight in the vector.
Figure 7.5(a), shows the percentage of malware detected by both the original
and reverse-engineered detectors, after injecting the malware using the information for
the reverse engineered detector at the basic block and at the function call levels. We
observe that the modified malware evades detection by both detectors.
We conduct a similar experiment for the NN detectors, where the classifier is
not clearly defined by a single vector and the separation plane is not linear. We develop
a heuristic approach to identify candidate instructions for insertion. Figure 7.4 shows a
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NN with one hidden layer. Each circle in the Figure represents a neuron in the network;
input, hidden, and output neurons. To compute the overall weight contributed by a
single input we multiple out its contributions to the eventual output of the network and
sum out these products. For the example in Figure 7.4, the weight of input I1 can be
estimated as:
w1 = w
1
11 × wout1 + w112 × wout2 + w113 × wout3
More generally, for input j, the weight is:
wj = Σ
n
i=1wji × wouti
With multiple hidden layers, we must add all the factors on all the paths to which a
given input contributes.
The procedure above allows us to collapse the description of the NN into a
single vector that summarizes the contributions of each feature. This allows us to use
the same strategies for instruction selection that we used in LR; for example, we can
select the instruction with the most negative weight for insertion. However, for NN this
is an approximate strategy; for LR, if we inject more of the negative weight instructions
we are guaranteed to monotonically decrease as the dot product of θ and the collected
feature from the malware execution becomes increasingly more negative. However, since
the separation surface of NN is non-linear, the same cannot be guaranteed.
Figure 7.5(b) shows the percentage of modified malware detected by the NN
victim and reverse-engineered detectors. While the evasive strategy also works in this
case, it is slightly less effective; with 2 injected instructions per basic block, we can evade
detection 80% of the time.
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Figure 7.4: Neural network with one hidden layer overview
As we explained in our threat model (Section 6.1), we assume that the attacker
is interested in maintaining the performance of the malware, and does not want to
arbitrarily slow it down to evade detection. Figure 7.6, shows the static and dynamic
overhead of injecting instructions both at the basic block level and the function call level.
Inserting a single instruction at the basic block level was effective in evading detection
for most malware for LR; both the static overhead (increase in the text segment of the
executable) and the dynamic overhead (increase in execution time) are about 10%.
We also consider selecting the instruction for injection among all the instruc-
tions with a negative weight, with a probability proportional to the weight; we call this
strategy the weighted injection strategy. Figure 7.7, shows the percentage of malware
detected by the victim, after weighted injection of the malware using the information
for both the reverse-engineered detector and the victim detector at the basic block and
at the function call levels. The evasion success using the reverse-engineered detector is
almost equal to the success when using the actual victim detector. The advantage of
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Figure 7.5: Detection performance of evasive malware using the least weight instruction
injection method
this strategy is that it makes it more difficult to detect the evasion if the detector is
retrained as explained in the next section.
7.2 Retraining Victim Detectors
The results of the previous section demonstrate that existing HMDs that use
supervised learning [38, 122] can be fairly easily evaded. The next question we consider
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is: if a detector is retrained with the addition of sample evasive malware, would it be able
to classify them correctly? If the answer is yes, then perhaps the weights can be updated
regularly to allow the detector to adapt to emerging malware. However, there is still
a possibility that the retrained detector could itself be reverse-engineered and evaded
again. Moreover, as attackers continue to evolve, it is not clear if the detector will
eventually become ineffective due to the number of classes it is attempting to separate,
or if it will converge to a classification setting that is impossible to evade.
Figure 7.8(a), shows the effect of increasing the percentage of evasive malware
programs in the training data that we use to retrain the simple LR detector. For
example, the point with 10% indicates that 10% of the malware part of the training set
consists of evasive malware modified with one of our evasion strategies. We see that in
general, increasing the percentage of evasive malware leads to more accurate detection.
Unfortunately, this comes at the price of loss of accuracy (sensitivity) for non-evasive
malware, making simple retraining an ineffective strategy. It’s interesting to note that
the correct classification of normal programs (specificity) does not suffer.
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Figure 7.7: Detection performance of evasive malware using the weighted injection
method.
Figure 7.9(a) illustrates why linear detectors such as LR have to sacrifice accu-
racy when retrained. Figure on the left shows that there is a linear separation between
the malware and regular programs. Figure in the middle demonstrates that in order to
evade detection, the evasive malware have to cross the separation boundary. Figure on
the right shows that with retrained detector it may be impossible to find a linear sepa-
ration between malware (including evasive malware) and regular programs. In contrast,
non-linear classifiers such as NN (Figure 7.8(b)) are able to detect this new form of mal-
ware with high accuracy even with a low percentage of evasive malware in the retraining
set. This can be achieved without affecting the detection accuracy of non-evasive mal-
ware or regular programs. Figure 7.9(b) illustrates why non-linear detectors are more
effective when retrained. Even when evasive malware crosses the separation boundary
of the original classification, a new non-linear boundary can be found that separates the
two malware classes from normal programs. Thus, HMDs must be non-linear if we want
to allow them to be retrained in response to evasive malware.
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Figure 7.8: Effectiveness of retraining; can retraining the detectors with evasive samples
detect evasive malware?
Figure 7.10 shows the detection of several generations of NN detectors. In each
generation, we repeat retraining of the detector by adding malware from the previous
generations to the training set. The original detector in generation 1 is first evaded
successfully as we see low detection for evasive malware. After we retrain, we see that
evasive malware developed to evade detector 1 is now detected successfully (rightmost
bar for detector 2). However, if we reverse-engineer the detector and evade it again, we
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Figure 7.9: Illustration of effect of retraining a linear and non-linear classifiers with data
that includes evasive malware.
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Figure 7.10: Evasive malware detection performance of NN detector for each retraining
on evasive malware generation.
can do so successfully as evidenced by the low detection of the evasive malware in the
third bar for detector 2. As the retrain-evade process is continued, we expected one of
two outcomes: (1) the detector will no longer be able to classify; or (2) the decision
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boundary will tighten and malware will no longer be able to evade. The second outcome
occurred: after 7 generations, the detector can no longer be trained successfully as
malware and normal programs became inseparable using our NN. There are two possible
explanations: (1) the feature is not sufficiently discriminative, and its possible to turn
malware to be similar to normal programs with respect to this feature. Note that in
each successive generation, the overhead is increased, and this level of overhead may not
be acceptable to the attacker; or (2) NN could no longer represent the complex decision
boundary between the different classes of evasive malware and normal programs, similar
to how LR failed after one generation.
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Figure 8.1: Building evasion-resilience HMDs project overview
After showing that the current generation of HMDs is vulnerable to evasion,
in this chapter, we explore whether new HMDs can be constructed that are robust to
evasion. In particular, we propose in Section 8.1 a new resilient HMD (RHMD) orga-
nization that uses multiple diverse detectors and switches between them unpredictably.
We show that RHMDs that use even simple base detectors are resilient to both reverse-
engineering and evasion. Furthermore, this resilience increases with the number and
diversity of the base detectors.
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In addition, in this chapter, we explore whether RHMDs fundamentally in-
crease the difficulty of evasion or simply present another hurdle that can be bypassed by
attackers. To this end, in Section 8.2 we overview recent results in Probably Approxi-
mately Correct (PAC) learnability theory that proves that RHMDs provide a measurable
advantage in increasing the difficulty of reverse-engineering and complicate evasion. By
making HMDs resilient to evasion, we bring them closer to practical deployment.
In summary, in this chapter, we develop a new class of evasion-resilient HMDs
(RHMDs) that operates by randomizing detection responsibility across different diverse
detectors. RHMDs cannot effectively be reverse-engineered to enable evasion, which
we support both experimentally and using recent results from PAC learnability theory.
The number and diversity of the individual classifiers used increases the resilience to
reverse-engineering and evasion. In addition, we study implementation complexity of
such classifiers in hardware.
8.1 Evasion-Resilient HMDs
Although retraining the detectors can allow the updated detectors (retrained
detectors using evasive malware samples) to detect evasive malware that has representa-
tives in the training set, we showed retraining may eventually fail as attackers continue to
evade. Moreover, retraining cannot detect novel evasive malware: even after retraining
they can be reverse-engineered and evaded.
In this section, we introduce a new class of evasion-resilient HMDs (RHMDs).
RHMDs leverage randomization to make detectors resistant to reverse-engineering and
therefore evasion. In particular, this is a strong advantage in the sense that random-
ization introduces an error to the reverse engineering that is bounded by a function of
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how often the detectors disagree; we show a proof for this claim in Section 8.2 based on
PAC learnability theory.
We randomize two settings of the detectors: i) The feature vectors used for de-
tection; and ii) The collection periods used in the detection. In particular, we construct
detectors with these heterogeneous features and switch between them stochastically in
a way that cannot be predicted by the attacker.
Our first study examines the effect of randomizing the feature vectors used for
detection. We start with two detectors using the same detection period. The results
of this experiment are shown in Figure 8.2(a). We reverse-engineer the detector using
two of the original feature vectors as well as a combination of them. In particular, the
point in the figure marked ”combined” represents reverse-engineering with a combined
detector using the union of the two feature vectors. Using an RHMD with two detectors,
reverse-engineering the detector becomes substantially more difficult because the model
now includes two diverse detectors which are selected randomly. The diversity can be
further expanded by using a pool of three detectors — the results of this approach are
shown in Figure 8.2(b). Again, the combined point on the figure refers to a reverse-
engineering attempt using the union of the three feature vectors of the three individual
detectors. As seen from the results, reverse-engineering becomes harder with increased
diversity.
To further increase detector diversity, we construct detectors with two different
collection periods (10K cycles period and 5K cycles period), resulting in a pool of six
detectors, which are randomly chosen by the detection logic. The results are presented
in Figure 8.3. Consistent with the previous trend, additional diversity makes reverse-
engineering even more difficult. Note that having detectors operating on the same
features with different period does not substantially increase the hardware complexity;
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the different weight for the two detectors must be kept separately, but the collection
logic and the detector evaluation logic is shared.
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Figure 8.2: Reverse engineering RHMD that have different features vectors for base
detectors.
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Figure 8.3: Reverse engineering RHMD that have different features vectors and detection
periods for base detectors.
Having reverse-engineered the detector, we use our evasion framework to in-
ject instructions to evade it. Given that the reverse-engineering becomes inaccurate in
RHMDs and given the random switch between the individual detectors, the constructed
evasive malware can no longer hide from detection (Figure 8.4). It is interesting to note
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that the higher the diversity of the detector, the more resilient it is to evasion, consistent
with PAC learnability theory discussed in the next section. These results demonstrate
that this approach to constructing HMDs provides resilience to evasive malware. The
average detection accuracy of the RHMD without evasion (Figure 8.4 with 0 injected
instructions) is equal to the average accuracy of its base detectors since the random-
ization selects between the detectors with equal probability. Thus, the average loss of
detection due to randomization is the difference of accuracy between the most accurate
detector and the average of all base detectors.
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Figure 8.4: RHMD evasion resilience; performance of detection evasive malware using
different configurations of RHMDs.
To evaluate the overhead of implementing the detectors for online detection [122],
the proposed resilient detectors were implemented using Verilog, as an extension of an
open source x86-compatible core (AO486) [4] to estimate the overhead. The detectors
collect information from the commit stage of the pipeline and apply the detection logic
at the detection period. After synthesizing the new core implementation on an FPGA
board for a configuration with three detectors corresponding to the three features with
the same period, we observed that the area and power increase is modest: 1.72% and
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0.78% respectively. Note that the resilient detectors can also be used to make oﬄine
detection [38] resilient to evasion.
8.2 Theoretical Basis for RHMD
This section provides theoretical support for the resilience of RHMD for evasion
based on probably approximately correct (PAC) learnability theory [?]. In particular, we
show that randomized classification is inherently more difficult to be reverse-engineered
than a deterministic classifier (even one with arbitrarily high complexity).
8.2.1 Learnability of Deterministic Classification
Consider a learning system (a defender) that uses a single classifier to detect
malware from normal programs. Consider also another reverse engineering learning
system (an attacker) that uses data of past classification collected, for example, by
repeatedly querying the defender classifier, to determine with high accuracy the nature
of the defender classifier.
Formally, let H be the class of possible classifiers (also called hypothesis class)
a learning system considers. Let P be the probability distribution over instances (x, y),
where x is an input feature vector, and y is a label in {0, 1}. We assume below that
y = h¯(x), i.e., a deterministic function that gives the true label of x. For any h ∈ H,
let e(h) = Prx∈P [h(x) 6= h¯(x)] be the expected error of h w.r.t. P . We define eH =
infh∈H e(h) as the optimal (smallest) error achievable by any function h ∈ H. Let
D = {(x1, y1), ..., (xm, ym)} be a training data set of size m generated according to P
and D be the set of all possible D. A learning algorithm is a function L : D → H which
produces a classifier hˆ ∈ H given a training set D.
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Definition 1 A hypothesis class H is learnable if there is a learning algorithm L for H
with the property that for any , δ ∈ (0, 1/2) and distribution P there exists a training
sample size m0(, δ), such that for all m ≥ m0(, δ), PrD∈D[e(L(D)) ≤ eH + ] ≥ 1− δ,
i.e., L will with probability at least (1 − δ) output a hypothesis hˆ ∈ H, whose error on
P is almost (eH + ). H is efficiently learnable if m0(, δ) is polynomial in 1/ and 1/δ,
and L runs in time polynomial in m, 1/ and 1/δ. 1
The definition of PAC learnability above says that a hypothesis class H is
efficiently learnable (i.e., learning is easy) if we can compute with high probability an
approximately optimal candidate from this class given a polynomial number of samples.
The error bound (eH + ) for an approximately correct classifier hˆ ∈ H consists of
two components.  becomes arbitrarily small and hence e(hˆ) approaches eH when the
number of training samples increases polynomially w.r.t. 1/. The other component
eH depends on the learning bias [?] about H. That is the set of assumptions that the
learner makes (e.g., the type of classifiers and the underlying features). With a good
choice of H, eH can be arbitrary small; eH is zero if H contains the true classifier h¯.
We observed the implications of this result in Section 6.3 when the correct feature and
detection period lead to the highest accuracy reverse engineered classifier.
The concept of PAC learnability applies to the learning tasks by both the
defender and the attacker, with one caveat: for the defender, the goal is to correctly
predict the true label of an instance (i.e., y = h¯(x)); while for the attacker, the goal
is to correctly predict the label of an instance assigned by the defender’s classifier (i.e.,
y = hˆ(x)). As shown in [162], efficient learning for h¯ by the defender implies efficient
learning for hˆ (called efficient reverse-engineering) by the attacker. Suppose that the
defender has learned hˆ from an efficiently learnable H. Provided the attacker identifies
1This definition is taken, in a slightly extended form, from [?].
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the type and features of the classifiers in H, then hˆ is contained in the hypothesis
class used by the attacker, and eH = 0, i.e., the distribution P over (x, h¯(x) can be
efficiently reverse-engineered with arbitrary precision [162]. Without prior knowledge
of H, the attacker can tune its hypothesis class based on the error rate on the training
data collected over repeated queries.
These results support the reverse-engineering experiments in Section 6.3. In
particular, the analysis shows that reverse-engineering a deterministic classifier is “easy”
in practice regardless of the complexity of the defender’s classifier. Increasing the com-
plexity of the defender’s classifier can make it more costly to reverse-engineer it, but
will not change the outcome of the arms race between the defender and attacker with
respect to the difficulty of evasion.
8.2.2 Learnability of Randomized Classification
We now consider a defender that uses randomized classification such as the
model used in RHMD. As before, consider a distribution P over instances (x, y), with y =
h¯(x) as the ground truth. Suppose that we have n hypothesis classes Hi, all efficiently
learnable. Let hˆi ∈ Hi be the classifier learned from these classes, respectively, with the
corresponding error rate e(hˆi). Additionally, let 4i,j = Prx∈P [hˆi(x) 6= hˆj(x)] for all i, j:
that is, 4i,j measures the difference between two classifiers hˆi(x) and hˆj(x) over the data
distribution. Consider a space of policies parametrized by pi ∈ [0, 1] with
∑
i pi = 1,
where we choose hˆi ∈ Hi with probability pi. Let ~p denote the corresponding probability
vector. Then, a policy ~p induces a distribution Q~p over (x, z), where z = hˆi(x) with
probability pi. The defender will incur a baseline error rate of e~p(h) = Prx∈Q~p [hˆi(x) 6=
h¯(x)] =
∑
i pie(hˆi) if there is no reverse-engineering effort.
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Suppose the attacker observes a sequence of data points fromQ~p, and tries to ef-
ficiently learn the hypothesis class H = ∪iHi. For any h ∈ H, let e~p(h) = Prx∈Q~p [h(x) 6=
hˆi(x)] =
∑
i pie(h), the expected error of h w.r.t. Q~p, and we define e~p,H = infh∈H e~p(h)
as the optimal (smallest) error achievable by any function h ∈ H under a policy ~p.
Definition 1 naturally extends to the randomized setting: in particular, the distribution
P becomes Q~p and the error bound (eH + ) becomes (e~p,H + ).
Theorem 1 Suppose that each Hi is efficiently learnable, and hˆi ∈ Hi be the classifier
learned from these classes by a defender, respectively, with the corresponding error rate
e(hˆi). Then, any distribution Q~p over (x, z) can be efficiently reverse engineered, with
e~p,H bounded by mini
∑
j 6=i pi4i,j ≤ e~p,H ≤ 2(maxi e(hˆi)). 2
This theorem shows that on the one hand, even with randomization, reverse-
engineering is easy as long as all classifiers among which the defender randomizes accu-
rately predict the target - that is maxi e(hˆi), the maximal error among the n classifiers,
is arbitrarily small. On the other hand, the attacker’s error depends directly on the
difference among the classifiers, which can be significant if at least some of the classifiers
are not very accurate, allowing them to disagree more often. According to the error
bound (e~p,H + ), even though  becomes arbitrarily small as the number of queried
samples increases, the defender will inevitably suffer from an error caused by e~p,H . This
error can be high; for example, when randomizing two classifiers of error 0.2 and 0.1
with p1 = p2 = 0.5, e~p,H is in [0.15, 0.4]. In contrast, in the deterministic setting, eH
can be 0. For our experiments with the pool of six detectors we measured the error to
be around 25% on our testing dataset.
2This theorem is formed by combining Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.3 (with detailed proofs)
from [162].
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The above theorem also suggests a trade-off between the accuracy of the de-
fender under no reverse-engineering vs. the susceptibility to being reverse-engineered:
using low-accuracy but high-diversity classifiers allow the defender to induce a higher
error rate on the attacker, but will also degrade the baseline performance against the
target. To combat reverse engineering effort, we propose to randomize among a set of
low-complexity, low-accuracy classifiers (e.g., logistic regression), rather than deploying
a single high-complexity, high-accuracy classifier (e.g., deep neural network or random
forest). The former is also more suitable for a hardware implementation than the lat-
ter. Although this low accuracy applies to the classification of each individual period,
we raise the overall accuracy of the detector by averaging the decisions across multiple
intervals.
8.2.3 Evasion Without Reverse Engineering
Figure 8.5: Impact of Randomization on Evasion
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Our threat model assumes that an attacker needs to reverse engineer a detector
before evading it. The theoretical resilience claims on RHMDs rely on the difficulty of
this reverse engineering. In this section, we consider whether it is possible to evade the
detector without reverse engineering. To provide intuition, we start with Figure 8.5,
which shows the decision boundaries of two diverse base detectors learned from hypoth-
esis classes H1 and H2. The two decision boundaries are not mutually exclusive (H1
malware regions are 2, 3 and H2 malware regions are 3, 4). To fool both detectors,
the malware has to move to region 1 which both detectors treat as normal. Note that
these decision boundaries represent hyperplanes in an n-dimensional feature space for
LR, and complex surfaces in the same space for NN. Therefore, as we increase diver-
sity the target area for evasion gets smaller. Thus, provided that detectors are diverse,
making random insertion guesses is unlikely to succeed and expensive to validate. Note
that evasion must succeed continuously across consecutive detection windows, which
complicates attempts to incrementally evade the detector.
This example also provides intuition on why randomization complicates reverse
engineering (as shown by Theorem 1). The attacker has to suffer a significantly increased
error (e~p,H) if she tries to learn a decision boundary from the same hypothesis classes
adopted by the defender. Otherwise, she has to learn a decision boundary of a higher
complexity class which requires exponentially larger number of samples.
If the attacker knows precisely the configuration of the base detectors of an
RHMD, we verified that it is possible to evade it, for example, by iteratively evading
each. This approach incurs a high overhead since instructions need to be injected to
evade each of the detectors. We do not consider this case as part of our threat model.
Resilience in this case may be achieved if we make the decision boundary of the RHMD
non-stationary. This can be accomplished by having a large set of candidate features
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and periods, of which a random subset is used for the RHMD at any given time. This
is an interesting area for future research.
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Figure 9.1: Leakage-free speculation project overview
Speculative execution is a standard microarchitectural technique used in vir-
tually all modern CPUs to improve performance. Recently, it has been shown that
speculatively executed instructions can leave measurable side-effects in the processor
caches and other shared structures even when the speculated instructions do not com-
mit and their direct effect is not visible. The recent Meltdown and Spectre attacks [98,
89, 58, 106, 93, 105, 160, 167, 29, 151, 9, 14, 140] (we call this class of attacks speculation
attacks) have shown that speculation can be exploited to expose information that is oth-
erwise inaccessible. In a typical scenario, attackers either mis-train the branch predictor
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unit or directly pollute it [46, 48] to force the speculative execution of code that reads
privileged data (privilege checks are not enforced during speculation). Although the
speculative instructions will eventually get squashed, leaving no direct data accessible
to the attacker, they leave a side-channel trail that can be used to infer the value. Sev-
eral attack variations have been demonstrated, including arbitrary exposure of the full
memory of other processes, OS kernel, hypervisor, and even SGX enclaves [29, 160] to an
unprivileged attacker, making this a dangerous open attack vector on modern systems.
We describe these attacks and present our threat model in Section 9.1.
Although a number of defenses and software patches have been proposed to
mitigate Spectre and Meltdown [159, 53], they often address only one aspect of the at-
tack, leaving attackers with other possible variations that are still available. In addition,
these patches often lead to high overheads: 10-30% reported on average, but often much
higher. For example, Netflix reported 800% slowdown with the Meltdown patches on
their systems [158, 52]. Most of the solutions target a subset of the threat models and
make assumptions that can be broken by future architectures.
In this project, we explore whether speculation can be made leakage free in a
principled way, enabling CPUs to retain the performance advantages of speculation while
removing the security vulnerabilities that speculation exposes. To this end, we introduce
SafeSpec, a design principle where speculative state is stored in temporary structures
that are not accessible by committed instructions. As instructions transition from being
speculative to committable, any speculative state is moved to the permanent structures.
On the other hand, if a speculative instruction is squashed, the speculative side effects
are canceled in place leaving no measurable side effects in the permanent structures
and closing the vulnerability exploited by speculation attacks. We consider two variants
that differ in when an instruction is considered safe to commit; In the wait-for-commit
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(WFC) variation, we consider an instruction speculative until it is committed. In the
wait-for-branch (WFB) variation, we consider an instruction to be committable when
the last control flow instruction it depends on commits. Note that only WFC prevents
Meltdown-style attacks which do not depend on a branch misspeculation, but it is
possible that other defenses can cover Meltdown since only Intel processors appear to
be vulnerable to it.
SafeSpec makes no assumptions on the branch predictor behavior or on specula-
tive execution behavior; for example, it does not prevent the attackers from mis-training
or even polluting the branch predictor, nor does it prevent them from speculatively read-
ing privileged data. Rather, SafeSpec interferes with the attacker’s ability to create a
covert channel using speculative data accesses to communicate illegally-accessed data
out. We describe SafeSpec in Section 9.2.
In summary, in this chapter, we introduce the SafeSpec model to protect spec-
ulation by isolating speculative state from committed state.
9.1 Speculation Attacks and Threat Model
In this section, we introduce speculation based side-channel attacks (specula-
tion attacks for short). The section first discusses speculative execution to characterize
the capabilities of the attacker, and then overviews the Meltdown and Spectre attacks.
9.1.1 Speculative Execution in Modern Processors
Speculative execution has been an important part of computer architecture
since the 1950s. The IBM Stretch processor implemented a predict not-taken branch
predictor [19]. As computer architecture continued to advance rapidly, the amount of
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speculation that is exploited has progressively been increasing with aggressive out-of-
order execution, supported by sophisticated branch predictor designs [176, 72, 144] that
are highly successful in predicting both the branch direction and its target address. In
particular, the number of pipeline stages in production CPUs has continued to grow to
the point where modern pipelines commonly have between 15 and 25 stages. Moreover,
with out-of-order execution, when a branch instruction stalls (e.g., due to a cache miss
on which it depends), instructions that follow the branch are continuously being issued.
Thus, the speculation window can be extremely large, typically limited by the size of
structures such as the reorder buffer, which can hold a few hundred instructions.
Speculation is designed to not affect the correctness of a program. Although
branch mispredictions occur and speculative instructions can ignore execution faults
(e.g., permission error for memory access) these semantics were not considered harmful
as mis-speculation will eventually be detected and the uncommitted instructions will
be squashed, leaving no directly visible modifications to the architectural state such as
registers and memory. Micro-architectural structures such as caches and TLBs are af-
fected by speculative operations, but the contents of the cache only affect performance,
not the correctness of a program. In fact, prior work has shown that there are beneficial
prefetching side-effects to speculatively executed instructions even those that are even-
tually squashed [112]. To exploit these effects, designs such as runahead execution [113]
intentionally increase the speculation window beyond the physical limitations of the re-
order buffer to generate additional cache misses further into the program to exploit their
prefetching effect. This approach was shown to significantly improve single-threaded
performance.
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Figure 9.2: Overview of speculation attacks.
9.1.2 Speculation Attacks
Meltdown and Spectre are two representative attacks of the class of speculation
attack. In general, these attacks exploit three properties of speculative execution in
modern processors:
• P1: branch prediction validation and permission checks are performed deep in
the pipeline and execution fault is generated only if the instruction is committed,
enabling speculative instructions to access data outside its privilege domain;
• P2: speculative instructions leave side-effects in micro-architectural structures
such as caches, which can be inferred using well-known techniques like Flush+Reload [174]
and Prime+Probe side-channel attacks [100].
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• P3: the branch predictor can be mistrained (Spectre 1), or directly polluted (Spec-
tre 2). It is shared across all programs running on the same physical core [58, 89,
46], allowing code running in one privilege domain to manipulate branch predic-
tion in another domain (e.g., kernel, VM, hypervisor, another process, or SGX
enclave).
Next, we overview how different variants of Spectre and Meltdown attacks
work, and distinguish them based on how they trigger and leverage speculative execution.
unsigned char secret;
dummy = array[secret * 64];
Figure 9.3: Secret-revealing gadget.
A Common Gadget
Speculation attacks aim to “read” memory/register content that is otherwise
restricted. Unlike traditional memory reads, speculative reads are based on triggering
speculative execution of a small code chunk, called gadget. A simplified example of
such gadget is demonstrated in Figure 9.3. Assume the variable secret holds a secret
value and is used as an index into a byte array. If processor speculatively executes this
code, a memory access will be generated, and as a result some data will be borough
into the data cache. Note that the secret variable controls what cache set will be
updated by the speculative execution hardware. The multiplication operation ensures
that different values of the variable will result in different cache sets. Because in many
cases the location of data and code structures in victim process memory is not secret,
the attacker, capable of monitoring CPU cache activity can link the observed behaviour
with the corresponding value of the secret variable. For example, by knowing cache
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set s0 is accessed when the value of secret is 0, the attacker can deduce that the value
of secret must be 1(modn), with n equals to the number of sets in the cache, when an
access to the cache set s1 is detected. Cache updates can be detected by attacker using a
range of cache side channel attacks [174, 100, 54]. Please note that in normal execution,
this code will never be executed, otherwise it will result in trivial cache side channel
leakage. In speculative attacks the attacker uses the properties P1 and P3 described
above to trigger the gadget to be speculatively executed by the victim.
if (offset < array1_size)
y = array2[array1[offset] * 64];
Spectre (Variant 1)
This variant of the attack can be demonstrated by the code presented in Fig-
ure ??. In this code, a victim process reads values from array1 using the offset provided
by the attacker. Then, resulting value is used to perform an access into array2. As
we discussed above, accesses into the array2 can be used by the attacker to deduce the
value of the index. The index, in its turn, is controlled by the attacker since attacker
controls the offset. Therefore, the attacker can use a carefully selected value of offset to
read arbitrary memory address which then will result in cache access observable by the
attacker. However, the if statement ensures there are no out of bounds memory accesses
allowed. Unfortunately, the attacker can exploit speculative execution and behavior of
branch predictor to force the victim process to perform an out of bounds memory access
in the following way:
a) The attacker triggers the code to be executed several times with the value of the
offset such that the if statement is always true (branch instruction not-taken). This
trains the branch predictor to predict the corresponding branch always not-taken;
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b) Next, the attacker flushes array1 size from the cache, forcing the CPU to fetch the
value of array1 size from memory, delaying the correct evaluation of the branch
and creating a large speculative window;
c) Finally, the attacker provides the malicious offset. The branch predictor unit
predicts the branch not-taken, resulting in two memory accesses that reveal the
value stored at the attacker’s desired address.
Spectre (Variant 2)
In this variant of the attack, the target program may not contain the expected
gadget or the offset is not controllable by the attacker. These limitations can be by-
passed by hijacking the speculative execution. Specifically, when the CPU encounters
an indirect branch instruction, the branch predictor tries to guess the target address and
the CPU immediately starts speculatively executing instructions at this address. Due
to P3, the attacker can perform the branch target poisoning to hijack the speculative
execution flow and to redirect it to any code location containing gadget instructions.
This resembles the return-oriented programming attack [28]. In summary, the variant 2
attack works as follows:
a) The attacker ensures that the attacking code and the victim code share the same
branch target buffer (BTB) by executing attacker’s process on the same physical
core with victim.
b) The attacker forces a BTB collision by matching virtual address of the victim and
attacker branch instructions [46].
c) The attacker performs target poisoning by executing its own branch.
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d) Finally, the attacker triggers the indirect branch to be speculatively executed,
redirecting the speculative execution to a gadgets of attacker’s choice. The gadget
will leak data through a side channel in a way similar to previously described.
Meltdown
Meltdown attack exploits P1: due to pipelining and instruction reordering a
permission check can happen after the corresponding memory accesses is speculatively
executed. For example, assume a user application that tries to read kernel memory.
Although such request will be eventually denied, the speculatively executed instructions
will result in loading of requested data into caches. Using a side channel, the attacker can
effectively read arbitrary kernel (or hypervisor) memory. This is a very powerful attack,
since typically kernel memory contains a direct mapped region allowing the attacker to
dump the entire physical memory on a given system. Since the exception eventually
will be raised, this attack requires the ability to tolerate and recover from segmentation
faults. Alternatively, if the attacker can arbitrarily control the exploit code, she can also
avoid the exception by putting the gadget behind a mispredicted branch, i.e., combining
Spectre V1 with Meltdown to read memory across privilege domains in the same virtual
address space.
9.1.3 Threat Model
Since P2 is essential in all speculation attacks, this work aims to eliminate
the side-effects from speculative execution. Hence, we assume a strong adversary for
the branch predictor and no software-based defense for branches (e.g., lfence and ret-
poline [159]). In particular, we assume that attackers can arbitrarily control the state
of the branch predictor, as if its state is programmable without any privilege. We as-
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sume attackers can launch a speculation attack either from the same process or another
process. We assume attackers have complete control over the attacking code (as in the
Meltdown attack) and know the complete layout of the victim domain (another pro-
cess, kernel, enclave, etc.). Their goal is to reveal memory and/or register content of
the victim domain. We assume the victim domain does not have any direct channel or
vulnerability to leak the content so attackers must utilize side-channels. To enable these
side-channel, we assume the victim domain contains the code gadget such as the one
in Figure 9.3 that can be invoked by attackers.
The technical solution we propose is general and applicable to different micro-
architectural structures. However, as a demonstration, our prototype implementation
only protects caches and TLBs to explore concretely the implications and complications
that result from SafeSpec. Therefore, we further assume that other covert channels,
including the ones through the branch predictor, memory bus and DRAM buffers are
out-of-scope for the current paper, but will be addressed using similar principles by
future work. Similarly, we only consider a system with a single core. Thus, speculation
attacks against the cache coherence and memory consistency model states [157] are also
left for future work. We discuss the implications on both of these in Section ??.
9.2 SafeSpec: Leakage-free Speculation
SafeSpec is a principled approach to secure processors against speculation at-
tacks while retaining the ability to carry out speculative execution to benefit from its
performance. The general principle (shown in Figure 9.4) addresses the problem at the
root by introducing shadow state to separate state that is produced speculatively with-
out affecting the primary structures of the processor (which we call committed state).
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Figure 9.4: SafeSpec overview
For example, if a speculative load instruction causes a load of a cache line, instead
of loading that cache line into the processor caches, we hold the line in a temporary
structure. If the load instruction is later squashed, these effects are removed in place,
leaving no changes to the cache from the misspeculated instructions, and closing the
vulnerability. Alternatively, if the instruction commits, the cache line is moved from the
temporary structure to the L1 cache. While is simple in principle, a number of questions
relating to its security, complexity and performance have to be resolved.
When to move state from speculative to committed. There are two options
available to decide when to move state from the shadow to the committed state. In
the first variation, which we call wait-for-branch (WFB), we can assume an instruction
to be no longer speculative when all the branches (more generally, all predictions) it
is dependent on have been resolved. WFB stops all variants of spectre which depend
on mistraining the branch predictor/return stack buffer; none of the mis-speculated
instructions moves to the committed state. However, it does not prevent Meltdown
which relies on speculation within a single instruction.The second variation wait-for-
commit (WFC) waits until the instruction commits before moving its effects to the
committed state, and therefore also prevents Meltdown.
Shadow state organization and size: If the shadow state structures are too small,
then either speculative state is replaced (causing a loss of an update to the committed
state if this data were to be committed later), or the instruction has to stall until there
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is room in the speculative structure before it issues. From a performance perspective,
the organization and size of the shadow structure should be designed such that the
structures can hold the speculative state generated by speculation as measured across
typical workloads. However, we will show that security considerations introduce more
stringent requirements on the speculative state.
Filtering Delayed Side Effects: One of the issues with SafeSpec occurs when an
instruction is squashed in the middle of its execution. If the instruction has already
initiated a high latency operation such as a read from memory, we have to ensure that
the response from memory can be discarded after it is received. We handle this situation
by discarding values received if there is no matching transaction. However, it may also
be desirable to filter these transactions lower in the system, such that the committed
transactions commit directly, and the squashed ones are cancelled in place. To control
the size of this filter, we include a branch id with the transactions and track operations
at the branch granularity. The filter can also be used to mark committed branches so
that memory responses corresponding to them are committed directly.
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Figure 10.1: Leakage-free speculation project overview
After introducing the SafeSpec model to protect speculation by isolating spec-
ulative state from committed state (chapter 9). In this Chapter, we demonstrate the
SafeSpec principle by building a memory hierarchy (caches and TLBs) that are free
from speculation-induced leakage. Making the memory hierarchy speculation-leakage
free prevents Meltdown and Spectre attacks. In particular, we expand the load-store
queues to store a pointer to a temporary associative structure that holds speculatively
loaded cache lines. We also introduce a similar structure to hold speculatively loaded
translation lookaside buffer (TLB) entries. We describe the design and some of the
complexity-performance trade-offs in Section 10.1. Furthermore, Section 10.2 presents a
performance, complexity and security analysis of SafeSpec. We also analyze the complex-
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ity of SafeSpec including the impact of all new structures and demonstrate a reasonable
increase in the area and power consumption. Finally, we show that SafeSpec stops proof-
of-concept implementations of all variants of Meltdown and Spectre, as well as the new
variants that we introduced.
10.1 SafeSpec for Caches and TLBs
To demonstrate the SafeSpec principle, we implemented it to protect CPU
caches and TLBs from leakage during speculative execution. To provide full protection,
all speculatively updated structures should follow the SafeSpec principle. We chose
the CPU caches because they are easily exploitable targets for covert communication
and the ones used in the Spectre/Meltdown attacks; caches have simple indexing and
with the availability of instructions such as clflush on x86, an attacker is able to
evict data which facilitates quick exfiltration using, for example, a flush+reload covert
channels [174].
To protect from speculative covert channels that occur during memory ac-
cesses, and following the SafeSpec principles, we need to add shadow state to protect
the following structures (Figure 10.2).
Data caches: this is the covert channel used in all three Meltdown/Spectre variants.
We add a shadow structure to hold the cache lines that have been fetched speculatively.
The structure is associatively-filled lookup table (filled associatively, but accessed as a
lookup-table). In the Load/Store queue, we point speculative loads that have received
their data to a corresponding entry in this table. Speculative instructions in the same
execution branch as the load that fetched a shadow cache line that accesses this cache
line can use the value from the shadow structure. If an instruction commits (depending
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Figure 10.2: SafeSpec extension to the CPU pipeline to create leakage-free memory
hierarchy (caches and TLBs).
on WFB or WFC), the cache line is moved from the shadow structure to the caches. If
the instruction is squashed, the shadow structure entry is marked as available. Thus,
not even the cache replacement algorithm state is affected by the speculative data that
does not commit.
Instruction caches: we built variants of Meltdown/spectre using the instruction cache
that replaces data dependent array access with dependent branches to a location in an
array to disclose the data through the i-cache, illustrating that it must be protected as
well 10.3. To develop this attack variant, we had to overcome branch predictor behavior:
data dependent branches were using the branch predictor, rather than the secret data.
Thus, we had to initialize the branch target buffer (BTB) to a third location, and then
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introduce sufficient delay in the pipeline for the data dependent branch such that it has
time to register the data dependent location in the i-cache.
TLBs: we also conjectured that the TLBs may be used as a covert channel vector. Given
recent attacks such as Foreshadow [160] and TLBleed [51] which directly target the
page translation behavior for speculation attacks, its critical to protect these structures.
Essentially, the data dependent access would target a page based on the value of the data,
causing the corresponding TLB entry to be initialized. Later, we can check the time
to access the page to see if it results in a TLB miss or not to derive the communicated
data.
To implement SafeSpec for the data cache, we add an associatively-filled lookup
table to hold speculatively read cache lines. It is important to note that memory con-
sistency models, such as Total Store Order (TSO) semantics of the x86-64, often ensure
that store side-effects appear in order; in other words, the cache is not updated until the
store commits, making stores robust to speculation attacks. We augment the load store
queue with a pointer to the shadow cache line for load operations that are speculative.
Any instruction dependent on the speculative load reads the cache line from the shadow
structure. Once the load instruction commits, the shadow cache line is written to the
caches according to the inclusion policy of the caches (in our case, since the caches are
inclusive, it is written to all levels of the cache) and freed in the shadow structure. If
the load is squashed, the value is freed in the shadow structure. For the i-cache and the
TLBs, we create similar shadow structures, and augment the reorder buffer (ROB) with
pointers to the shadow state entries if the instruction is speculative and the cache line
(or TLB entry) were fetched speculatively.
From a performance perspective, the structures should be sized such that they
accommodate the speculative state needed by representative workloads. If the shadow
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attackMode <-- 0;
secret <-- readSecret();
int (*fnPtr)[256 * 256];
for all ascii in (ASCII-character)
{
define int func_ascii() //noop sled
{
asm volatile(".rept 256;" "nop;"".endr;");
return 0;
}
(*fnPtr)[ascii * 256] <-- func_ascii
}
clflush(&array1_size);
clflush(fnptr);
function speculative(secret)
{
if (secret < array1_size)
gadgetFunc(secret, attackMode);
}
function gadgetFunc(secret, attackMode)
{
if (secret == 'A' && attackMode)
fnPtr[A*256]();
// ... 256 If Structures for
// all ASCII characters
if (secret == 'z' && attackMode)
fnPtr[z * 256]();
junkLoc();
}
for (i = 1...256)
{
t1 = rdtscp();
junk = fnptr[i * 256](); //check cache hit
t2 = rdtscp();
}
Figure 10.3: I-cache variant of Spectre
structures are full, we could either drop some of the shadow state (leading to loss of
updates to the committed state with performance, rather than correctness implications),
or block until there is space in the shadow state before issuing an instruction (also with
performance implications). We will see later that the constraints introduced by security
requirements to eliminate TSAs are more stringent than those required by performance.
Figures 10.4 show the distribution of the size of the speculative state sampled over
time for the SPEC 2017 benchmarks. The shadow d-cache for 3 of our benchmarks
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Figure 10.4: Shadow structure size that fits 99.99% of caches and TLBs accesses.
grows occasionally to almost the maximum possible size (bound by the size of the load-
store queue). A shadow i-cache with about 25 cache lines is sufficient for all of the
benchmarks. In addition, less than 10 entries are sufficient for speculative iTLB misses,
but some benchmarks require more dTLB entries (up to 25). Given that the overhead
of supporting WFC is small, we elect to support WFC to get the increased protection
to cover Meltdown.
10.2 Evaluation
Table 10.1: Configuration of the Simulated architecture
Parameter Configuration
CPU 6-way issue, 96 Issue Queue entries, out-of-order,
no SMT, 72 Load Queue entries, 56 Store Queue entries,
224 ROB entries, 64 iTLB entries, 64 dTLB entries,
commit up to 6 Micro-Ops/cycle
Private L1 i-/d-Cache 32 KB, 8-way, 64B line, 4 cycle hit
Shared L2 Cache 256 KB, 4-way, 64B line, 12 cycle hit
Shared L3 Cache 2 MB, 16-way, 64B line, 44 cycle hit
We conduct experiments with MARSSx86 [127], which is a cycle-accurate full-
system simulator of out-of-order x86 cores. We configured the CPU and cache models
of MARSSx86 to simulate the Intel Skylake processor as shown in Table 10.1.
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Figure 10.5: SafeSpec relative performance to non-secure OoO execution CPU using
IPC values of running SPEC2017 benchmarks.
10.2.1 Performance Analysis
The first experiment measures the performance of compared to the baseline
processor under conservative condition. In particular, we consider the shadow state
access time to be equivalent to the access time of the L1 cache (4 cycles), when it
is substantially smaller, and accessed as a lookup table. Figure 10.5, shows the IPC
values for all SPEC2017 benchmarks. We see a small improvement in performance
with a geometric mean of about 3%. We believe that this advantage results from a
combination of effects including the larger effective cache size and avoiding polluting
the cache with wrong path speculative state.
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Figure 10.6: d-cache read miss rates including shadow d-cache
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Figure 10.7: Percentage of hits on shadow d-cache
To gain more insight into the observed performance, Figure 10.6 shows the miss
rate on read operations in the d-cache. There is little difference in behavior between
SafeSpec and the baseline with respect to the data accesses. Figure 10.7 shows the
percentage of the reads that hit the shadow structures.
The i-cache behavior is significantly different than the d-cache. Figure 10.8
shows the miss rate on the i-cache. For the i-cache, there are more substantial differences
between WFC and the baseline. Some outlier behavior such as Pop2 and imagick where
the percentage of i-cache misses drops significantly could be due to the larger size of
the shadow structures expanding the effective size of the cache reducing conflict and
capacity misses. Moreover, we see in Figure 10.9 that most of the hits occur in the
shadow i-cache structure reflecting the high spatial locality of the access patterns in the
i-cache; in other words, while a cache line is still speculative, several instructions execute
from the same cache line. In contrast, the d-cache has less spatial locality, resulting in
fewer accesses hitting the shadow state. We note that the cache miss rates are combined
for all instructions (i.e., we do not exclude instructions that are squashed); therefore,
many of these hits in the shadow structures may not end up being productive.
To understand the benefits of the shadow structure in filtering misspeculated
accesses, Figure 10.10 shows the percentage of the shadow state that ends up being
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committed for the i-cache and the d-cache. We observe that a substantially higher
percentage of the d-cache state ends up being committed, perhaps due to the fact that
speculative loads are issued later in the pipeline making them more likely to commit.
For both the d-cache and especially the i-cache, the shadow structure filters a large
number of misspeculated accesses that are squashed without cluttering the caches.
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Figure 10.8: i-cache miss rate including the shadow i-cache
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Figure 10.9: Percentage of hits on shadow i-cache
10.2.2 Security Analysis
Table 10.2 shows that both WFC and WFB close Spectre attacks, but only
WFC is guaranteed to also stop Meltdown attacks. We evaluated our proof of concept
code implementing Spectre in the simulator and found indeed that the attack fails under
both WFC and WFB models. We evaluated the protection coverage for Spectre-style
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Figure 10.10: Commit rate of shadow state
Table 10.2: Security Analysis of Meltdown/Spectre
Spectre WFC WFB Meltdown WFC WFB
Spectre-PHT [89, 86] 3 3 Meltdown [98] 3 7
Spectre-BTB [89] 3 3 Foreshadow [160, 167] 3 7
Spectre-STL [59] 3 7 Variant 3a [9] 3 7
Spectre-RSB [93, 105] 3 3 Lazy FP [151] 3 7
Variant 1.2 [86] 3 7
attacks targeting structures other than the d-cache (i-cache, iTLB, and dTLB). All three
side channels were closed. We tested proof of concept code for the i-cache and a transient
attack through the d-cache and observed that the attack fails on the SafeSpec protected
CPU. We could not get TLB-based attacks working in the simulator, perhaps because
of the large delays of page walks, or due to the limitations of the MarSSx86 models of
the TLBs.
10.2.3 Hardware overhead
Table 10.3: SafeSpec hardware overhead at 40nm.
Power (mW ) Power (%) Area (mm2) Area (%)
Secure 290.27 26.4 9.79 17
WFC 35.14 3 1.17 2
introduces hardware overheads to the CPU pipeline due to the addition of
the shadow structures. We compared the hardware overhead for two different sizes
for the shadow structures; 1) Secure: shadow structure size equal to the maximum
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speculative state during speculation; and 2) SafeSpec with WFC: shadow structure
sizes were optimized based on 99.99% speculative state size for SPEC2017 benchmarks
using the WFC implementation. We report the area, power, and access time values,
as well as a percentage compared to the Skylake CPU L1 cache configuration (shown
in Table 10.1), using CACTI v5.3 [147] in Table 10.3. The results show that the area
overhead is tolerable for the secure design, making the design highly practical.
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Figure 11.1: Leakage-free speculation project overview
After introducing the SafeSpec model to protect speculation by isolating spec-
ulative state from committed state (chapter 9) and demonstrating it by building a
leakage-free memory hierarchy that prevents speculation attacks (Chapter 10). In this
Chapter, we identify a transient type of leakage that occurs in the introduced speculative
state (byproduct of SafeSpec) that we call transient speculation attacks (TSAs); Safe-
Spec by construction prevents speculative values from affecting the state of committed
structures, which is the pathway used to communicate data covertly in the published
speculation attacks. However, it does not create isolation between instructions that are
in the speculative state. This creates a possibility for a new variant of attacks which
we call transient speculation attacks (TSAs). In particular, since most instructions that
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commit start in the speculative state, there is a window of time where they can share
the speculative state with misspeculated instructions before they are squashed. If we
are not careful, it is possible to create a covert channel in this period to communicate
the sensitive data from the mis-speculated branch to the branch that will be committed,
allowing the data to be exfiltrated.
Consider the example of a shadow structure that is sized to be small (let’s
say one entry). The malicious speculative code that reads the privileged data can then
communicate it covertly to speculative code (the ”receiver” code that will commit) using
the shadow state. For example, it can replace the entry in the shadow state, causing
the receiver to notice the absence of its speculative state (since it was replaced) after it
commits. Alternatively, if we block when the shadow structure is full, the receiver can
detect that its code took a longer time to execute.
Although TSAs are strictly less powerful than the original attack, they must be
carefully considered to ensure that leakage is not possible. One way to solve this problem
is to either partition the speculative state per branch, or to size it generously, or even
for the worst case scenario, to ensure that no leakage occurs through the shadow state.
TSAs can also attempt to communicate covertly by creating contention on functional
units or other shared structures; this is an issue that we also consider. We discuss how
to mitigate TSA attacks in Section 11.1.
11.1 Transient Speculation Attacks: Covert Channels in
the Speculative State
The SafeSpec principle prevents direct side-channel leakage from the specu-
lative state to the committed state, closing all known speculation attacks. However,
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although the committed instructions and the speculative instructions eventually reside
in separate structures, creating the separation and closing the channel, eventually com-
mitted instructions can start out as speculative. During this window, the eventually
committed instructions share the shadow state with any speculative instructions that
will be squashed. If the shadow structures are not designed carefully, covert channels
can be created during this transient window to communicate sensitive data (which can
only be read by a mis-speculated path) to an instruction pathway that will be committed
such that the leakage results are visible to the program. It is important to emphasize
that these attacks (which we call Transient Speculation Attacks, or TSAs) are substan-
tially more difficult than Spectre/Meltdown because there is only a limited window of
speculation in which the malicious Trojan code must not only read sensitive data, but
also create measurable contention to the spy before either of their predicate branches
commits.
TSAs are possible only if the shadow structures are shared and sized such that
they enable contention. Consider an example where we size the TLB shadow structures
based on typical program behavior. Since programs do not have many pending TLB
misses within a speculation window, it stands to reason to size these structures to be
small. In the rare case when the shadow structures are full, we may handle this by
either discarding updates or by blocking the issue of requests when there is no room in
the shadow structure. Either of these behaviors provides potential for a covert channel.
Consider that the Trojan fills the structures with TLB misses if it wants to communicate
a 1. If updates are discarded, a spy can detect a communication if its TLB accesses
are not committed (they were discarded). Alternatively, if we block TLB accesses when
the structures are full, the spy can detect a communication of 1 if its TLB accesses are
delayed causing a longer TLB miss time. The attack is illustrated in Figure 11.2.
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Figure 11.2: Transient speculation attack (TSA) overview
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To prevent TSAs through the shadow structures, we elect to provision them for
the worst case scenario to make sure that transient contention cannot be created within
a speculation window. This approach guarantees that no contention on the shadow
structures is possible, at the cost of provisioning fairly large associative structures. We
believe that with some more analysis, or with some detection defense that detects an
attack when the shadow structures grow abnormally large, this worst case provisioning
can be substantially relaxed without introducing leakage.
132
Chapter 12
Conclusions and Future Work
The increasing number of attacks on computing systems motivated the need
to consider cybersecurity as a fundamental requirement for designing and evaluating
computing systems on par with performance, functionality, or power consumption. Fur-
thermore, the limitations of software solutions necessitate the need to view security as
hardware/software problem – can originate in hardware/software and to be solved by
hardware and/or software. Therefore, in this dissertation, we pursue approaches to
building defenses in the architecture to help make the software more secure. Specifi-
cally, introduced EnsembleHMDs that improve the performance of single HMDs using
an ensemble of specialized detectors. Furthermore, we showed that current implemen-
tations of HMDs are not resilience to evasion attacks and proposed a new constriction
for HMDs (called RHMDs) to make HMDs more resilience to evasive malware. Finally,
we proposed a principled architecture solution to deafened against speculation attacks
with minimum impact on performance. Although we addressed the limitations/threat
models of the problems proposed in this dissertation, these areas still have open research
problems. In this chapter, we are going to discuss completed research and future work.
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12.1 Accurate Hardware Malware Detectors
In this project, we seek to improve the detection performance of hardware
malware detectors (HMDs) through ensemble learning to increase the efficiency of a
Two-Level Detector (TLD). We envision an HMD that uses low level features to provide
the first line of defense to detect suspicious processes. This detector then prioritizes
the effort of a heavyweight software detector to look only at programs that are deemed
suspicious, forming a TLD.
We started by evaluating whether specialized detectors can be more effectively
classify one given class of malware. We found out that this is almost always true for the
features and malware types we considered. We then examined different ways of combin-
ing general and specialized detectors. We found that ensemble learning by combining
general detectors provided a limited advantage over a single general detector. However,
combining specialized detectors can significantly improve the sensitivity, specificity, and
accuracy of the detector.
We developed metrics to evaluate the performance advantage from better de-
tection in the context of a TLD. Ensemble learning provides more than 16.6x reduction
in the online detection overhead with the NN specialized ensemble detector. This rep-
resents 2x improvement in performance (overhead) with respect to Ozsoy et al. [123]
single detector implementation. We implemented the proposed detector as part of an
open core to study the hardware overhead. The hardware overhead was minimal: around
2.88% increase in area, 9.83% reduction in cycle time, and less than 1.35% increase in
power. We believe that minor optimization of the MEM feature collection circuitry
could alleviate most of the cycle time reduction.
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We compared the performance and overhead of LR to NN as base classifiers.
NN based ensemble detectors provide the highest classification accuracy of all the detec-
tors we developed. Although they are more complicated to implement, we used hardware
optimizations to reuse a single perceptron sequentially to implement the neural network,
making the hardware overhead small compared to LR.
Finally, we carried out a study of how the detector performs as malware evolves
over time. Specifically, we trained a detector with an old malware data set and evaluated
its performance on both malware from the same generation, as well as more recent
malware. We discovered that the detection performance rapidly deteriorates as malware
evolves. In addition, the detectors also fail when trained using only recent malware when
classifying old malware. These results emphasize the necessity to provide a secure way
to update the hardware detector weights and thresholds as malware continues to evolve.
For our future work, we will study the effect of choosing a threshold for the
detectors that favors sensitivity or specificity over the other, by inserting weights for
them in the objective function, on the performance of the two-level detection system.
12.2 Evasion-Resilient Hardware Malware Detectors
In this project, we targeted the recently proposed Hardware Malware Detectors
which have demonstrated remarkable accuracy in classifying malware using low-level
features. In one model, when implemented in hardware, they can help monitor all
programs as they run to detect malware with high accuracy, and at a cost order of
magnitude lower than software monitoring. There is evidence that these detectors will
be incorporated in commercial processors [132].
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If HMDs are widely deployed, we must expect that attackers will attempt to
evade detection as is the case in any adversarial setting. We believe that this is the
first paper that considers this issue in detail for HMDs. In particular, we showed that
the attacker can accurately reverse-engineer earlier proposed detectors. Moreover, once
the detector is reverse-engineered, we demonstrated simple evasive techniques that can
successfully hide malware from detection. Although existing HMDs admit that these
detectors may be vulnerable to evasion, these results conclusively confirm that malware
can evade such detectors, rendering them ineffective.
We considered that detectors can be retrained to capture evasive malware once
samples become known (similar to the current practice of updating virus signatures).
For LR, such retraining was not effective: considering evasive malware compromised
the classification performance on normal malware; due to linear separation, it is not
possible to produce LR detectors that successfully catch both. In contrast, NN could
easily be retrained to detect evasive malware. Thus, non-linear classifiers need to allow
the detectors to be retrained to capture emerging malware. However, after several rounds
of evade-retrain game, the NN classifier could also no longer be effectively retrained.
We proposed resilient HMDs that switch randomly between a diversity of de-
tectors. We showed that such detectors can resist reverse-engineering and complicate
evasion. We showed both empirically, and from PAC learnability theory, that their re-
silience increases with the number and diversity of the individual detectors available to
select from. With this class of resilient HMDs, hardware malware detection becomes a
promising direction in malware detection.
In our future work, we will investigate more powerful attacks on RHMDs; al-
though RHMDs are resilient to reverse engineering since they are unpredictable (the
output may differ for the same input when querying the victim multiple times), a more
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powerful attacker could use this feature to her advantage to create a new label that can
be used to train the reverse-engineered detector. For example, consider the following
possible attack. The attacker would first query the victim RHMD using the attacker
training data set multiple times (enough to query all base detectors in the RHMDs).
As a results, for each input from the attacker training data set, three output scenarios
may happen: (1) Malware (M): all base detectors agree that the input is a malware,
(2) Regular (R): all base detectors agree that the input is a regular program, and (3)
Unknown (X): some base detectors think this programs in a malware while the others
think that it is a regular program. Figure 12.1, shows an overview of possible outputs
of an RHMD that have two base detectors. Therefore, if the attacker labeled the unpre-
dictable input with a different label than malware or regular program (Unknown (X)
in our example), then train the reverse engineered detector on the labeled data, the
reverse-engineered detector would have a model that can distinguish between the three
classes that the attacker trained the model on. Now, since the attacker has access to
the reverse-engineered model, the attacker can inject instructions in a way that moves
the decision of RHMD from being malware across all decision boundaries (of all base
detectors) to being regular.
Furthermore, to defend against such powerful attacks, we would like to inves-
tigate the creation of more powerful RHMDs. In particular, we want to build RHMDs
with base detectors that have the following features:
• Large number of base detectors: by increasing the number of base detectors we
are increasing the number of quires the attacker needs to do to query all base-
detectors, which is needed for the more powerful attack. In addition, by figuring
out fastest time the attacker can query all base detectors which should be very long
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Figure 12.1: Overview of RHMD possible outputs given 2 base detectors
(for example, days, weeks, months, or even years), this can be set as a threshold to
update the base detectors so that the attack would fail. It would also be interesting
to come up with automatic update strategies for the base detectors in a random
way.
• Different detection spaces: use different feature spaces for different base detectors
so that if an evasive sample is created to evade detection in one feature space
does not necessarily evade detection in other spaces. For example, changing the
instructions that the malware is using to create evasive sample does not change
the malware memory accesses footprint.
• Zero transferability between base detectors: transferability between two detectors
(A and B), is the percentage of evasive samples that are crafted to evade detector
A that can also evade detector B. Therefore, if we can create base detectors that
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have zero transferability between them, then crafting evasive samples that can
evade detection of all base detectors would be very hard.
Essentially, these techniques make the composition space of HMDs large and
time-variant, making it difficult to construct attacks that evade them. Selection of low
transferability detectors also complicates the development of successful attacks against
reverse engineered models. We leave these advanced attacks and the detailed exploration
of such defenses to future work.
12.3 Leakage Free Speculation
We presented a general principle for supporting speculative execution in a way
that makes out-of-order processors immune to speculation-based attacks. The principle
relies on leaving speculative state in shadow structures, and only committing this state
once the instructions that generate them are guaranteed to commit. Thus, side-effects of
misspeculation are hidden from the primary structures of the CPU, closing the vulner-
ability. We demonstrated the principle of protecting caches and TLBs of the CPU. Our
design closes new variants of attacks that we developed to leak through the i-cache or
the TLBs. We showed that careful design is needed to prevent a form of leakage that can
arise while instructions share the speculative state. We mitigate this leakage by sizing
the speculative state conservatively. Constructed this way, transient attacks also become
impractical. The performance of the SafeSpec CPU was actually slightly higher than an
unmodified CPU, despite conservative estimates on the shadow state. We believe that
the presented design represents a first step of many towards a principled protection of
speculative execution. To provide complete protection, other microarchitectural states
that can be updated speculatively should use the same principle.
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One of SafeSpec’s limitations is that it requires a deep redesign of the CPU to
separate out the speculative state from the permanent state. It also has implications on
security: we identified a form of transient side channels that occur through the shadow
structures. The goal of this paper is to establish the SafeSpec principle by protecting
the CPU caches and TLBs. We recognize that other structures affected by speculative
instructions must also be protected using this principle or otherwise the attackers will
switch to using them. Future work should look at protecting the branch predictor,
DRAM buffers, account for prefetchers, as well as other structures.
Another limitation of SafeSpec is that we do not support multi-threaded work-
loads. Addressing this limitation involves two considerations. The more straightforward
consideration is how to preserve the semantics of protocols such as cache coherence,
memory consistency models, atomic operations, and transactional memory. We believe
that these continue to operate in the same way by treating the speculative state to be
part of the state of the caches. The second issue is significantly more difficult: these
protocols themselves can be used to communicate speculative side-effects as has been
recently shown by the MeltdownPrime attack [157]. Designing leakage-free protocols
is a difficult problem that deserves separate and complete treatment and therefore we
elected to leave supporting multi-threaded workloads to future work.
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